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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article discusses whether the venerable decision in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins1 requires a federal district court,
hearing a case under its diversity jurisdiction, to use the
preliminary injunction standard that would be applied by a court
of general civil jurisdiction in the state where the federal court is
located. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 65(a) on preliminary
injunctions does not provide a standard that a federal district
court must apply in ruling on these motions, 2 and the same is true
of state rules of procedure based on Federal Rule 65. 3
Nevertheless, most federal and state courts weigh roughly the
4
same four criteria in ruling on motions for provisional relief.
However, courts in some jurisdictions evaluate the factors on a
sliding scale or with a balancing test while some federal circuits
require the moving party to establish each of them. 5 The choice-oflaw issue is whether a federal court can go with the more

I 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Supreme Court held that Erie principles were applicable to
proceedings in equity in Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 205 (1938).
2 FED. R. CiV. P. 65(a) states:
(a) Preliminary Injunction.
(1) Notice. The court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice
to the adverse party.
(2) Consolidating the Hearing with the Trial on the Merits. Before or
after beginning the hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction,
the court may advance the trial on the merits and consolidate it with
the hearing. Even when consolidation is not ordered, evidence that is
received on the motion and that would be admissible at trial becomes
part of the trial record and need not be repeated at trial. But the court
must preserve any party's right to jury trial.
3 See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(a) (2015) (using, essentially, the same language used in
FED. R. CIv. P. 65(a)).
I The four factors are: (1) the threat that the moving party will suffer irreparable injury
if the injunction is not granted; (2) the moving party's likelihood of success on the merits; (3)
the possible hardships to the moving party if the injunction is not granted outweigh the
possible harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted (also called the balance of
equities); and (4) granting the injunction will be in the public interest. Winter v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citations omitted); Bishop v. Patton, 706
S.E.2d 634, 638-39 (Ga. 2011) (citations omitted); cf. SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP v. Branch
Banking & Trust Co., 709 S.E.2d 267, 271 n.7 (Ga. 2011) (clarifying that Bishop should not
be read as requiring the moving party to prove all four factors).
See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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demanding federal standard without offending the principles
flowing from Erie and its progeny. The federal court will be
applying the applicable state substantive law when it hears and
decides a diversity case,6 but how far does it have to go in
replicating its state's practice on the grant or denial of the
7
provisional remedy?
This Erie doctrine choice-of-law issue regarding the standard
for preliminary injunctions has been litigated in several
jurisdictions, 8 discussed in several articles,9 and mentioned in
passing by the United States Supreme Court. 10 Some courts have
said that federal law governs the standards for issuing a

6 Ferrero v. Associated Materials, 923 F.2d 1441, 1444-46 (l1th Cir. 1991); CHARLES A.
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2943, 4513, at 442-43 (3d ed. 1995).
7 Cf. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 251 (8th ed. 2012) C'Erie established that
federal courts sitting in a diversity action were bound to replicate state practice in some
circumstances .... rflts setting suggested that at the very least federal courts sitting in
diversity should observe state substantive law ... ").
8 See, e.g., Ferrero,923 F.2d at 1448 (deciding to apply federal rather than state law to
determine whether the preliminary injunction was properly issued); Equifax Servs., Inc. v.
Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355, 1361 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting the Erie doctrine does not apply to
preliminary injunctions); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 894 F. Supp. 2d
691, 706 (E.D. Va. 2012) (holding that the rule of Erie required the court to use state
standards for a preliminary injunction); Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, 878 F. Supp. 1224,
1243-44 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (discussing whether to apply state or federal standards for
granting a preliminary injunction); see also Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals &
Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp. 923, 931 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (citing several conflicting
opinions, issued between 1947 and 1969, as to whether state or federal law governs the
issuance of an injunction).
9 See, e.g., John T. Cross, The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 LA. L. REV. 173, 189-92 (1999)
(reviewing the circuit split over whether Erie applies to equitable remedies); David Crump,
The Twilight Zone on the Erie Doctrine: Is There Really a Different Choice of Equitable
Remedies in the "Court a Block Away'?, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1233, 1242-49 (discussing lower
court decisions applying Erie to equitable remedies like preliminary injunctions).
1o See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A v. Aliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318
n.3 (1999) ("Petitioners argue for the first time before this Court that under [Erie] the
availability of this injunction under Rule 65 should be determined by the law of the forum
state .... Because this argument was neither raised nor considered below, we decline to
consider it."). The U.S. Supreme Court had an opportunity to discuss the Erie doctrine and
Rule 65 in the Grupo Mexicano decision but failed to explain the relevance of the Rule and
the implications of Erie. Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History,
and Limitations on Federal JudicialPower-A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291,
1312 (2000).
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preliminary injunction in diversity actions,' while others have
applied state law governing preliminary relief. 12 Of course, the
general Erie doctrine issue about which state laws and practices
must be applied in diversity actions has troubled many courts and
commentators since Erie was decided in 1938.13 It is clear that the
federal courts are to defer to state courts as lawmaking bodies.14
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the federal courts
are an independent judicial system. 15 After all, "[t]he line between
procedural and substantive law is hazy, but no one doubts federal
16
power over procedure."'
This Article analyzes this particular choice-of-law issue by
focusing on several decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court and
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The rationale for
this focus is that there is a substantial discrepancy between
Georgia's standard for preliminary relief and the Eleventh
Circuit's standard.
The difference is significant enough that
choosing to apply one standard instead of the other could result in
a different outcome on the grant or denial of a preliminary
injunction. 17 Notwithstanding the possible outcome-determinative

11Vector Sec., Inc. v. Stewart, 88 F. Supp. 2d 395, 399 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that
"federal law governs the standards for issuing a preliminary injunction").
12 Kaiser Trading Co., 321 F. Supp. at 931 n.14 (stating that "the best approach would be
to look to state law to determine if "parliamentary injunction as permissible. Then,... look
to federal law to determine whether the court should exercise its dissention."); Port of N.Y.
Auth. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745, 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) (deciding that state,
rather than federal, law applied); see also Cross, supra note 9, at 189-90 (noting some
courts to apply state law governing preliminary injunctions); Crump, supra note 9, at 127273 (same).
11 See generally RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 507-08 (3d ed. 2012); Edward A.

Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and Social Change
Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004) (discussing
Erie and the lessons one can learn from it). See also Burbank, supra note 10, at 1301 n.56,
1312 (the Supreme Court had an opportunity to rule on a variation of the preliminary
injunction standard question in GrupoMexicano but declined to do so).
14 See YEAZELL, supra note 7, at 251 (identifying the opposing principles "that Erie
requires deference to state courts as lawmaking bodies; and that federal courts are on
independent judicial system").
15 Id.

Id. (citing Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring)).
See, e.g., Ferrero v. Associated Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1448 (l1th Cir. 1991)
(noting that the significant difference between Georgia and federal law regarding injunctions
could lead to on outcome determinative result).
16
'1
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effect of this choice, as well as the possibility of forum shopping,
this Article concludes that federal district courts should apply
their federal circuit's preliminary injunction standard when ruling
on requests for provisional relief in actions where subject matter
jurisdiction is based on diversity.
This conclusion is not justified simply by saying that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) is on point and controls, or because
the choice of the appropriate standard is a matter of procedure.
Rather, it is justified by analyzing and weighing the several
factors that have been announced by the U.S. Supreme Court for
the typical unguided Erie choice. Of these factors, the most
important are (1) that the differences between the standards do
not result in litigant inequality, (2) that the forum state's and the
federal circuit's interests in the grant or denial of equitable relief
are congruent, and (3) that the grant or denial of a preliminary
injunction is provisional and not a final adjudication of the merits
of the claim. 18 Moreover, given the similarity of the four criteria
weighed by the respective courts, 19 there is a good chance that a
state's court of general jurisdiction and a federal district court
located in that state will enter substantially similar orders on a
plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction when they are
20
presented with the same facts.
In order to clearly illustrate this Erie doctrine choice-of-law
issue, this Article presents a hypothetical lawsuit filed in Georgia,
in which a plaintiff employer seeks a preliminary injunction
against a defendant employee who wants to go to work for a
competitor. It then discusses the preliminary injunction remedy
generally and sets out the standards now applied in the Eleventh
Circuit and in the Georgia courts, summarizing several decisions
to illustrate how the criteria are applied. Next, the Article
explains how the differences between the Eleventh Circuit and
Georgia standards implicate the Erie doctrine.
This section
includes a summary of scholarly commentary on this choice-of-law
issue as well as a discussion of some of the cases that have ruled
See infra Part IV.
19 See supra note 4 (listing out four criteria).
20 See infra Part IV.
18
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on this Erie doctrine question. The Article's last section applies
the U.S. Supreme Court's several tests for resolving Erie doctrine
questions and ultimately concludes that a federal district court
should use its federal circuit's preliminary injunction standard.
II. A HYPOTHETICAL CLAIM AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
STANDARDS

Start by assuming a hypothetical dispute between an employee

from North Augusta, South Carolina and his employer, a Georgia
company based just across the Savannah River in Augusta,
Georgia. This employee has had access to customer lists and other
proprietary information belonging to his employer, and he is about
to jump ship to a competitor notwithstanding the non-compete
clause in his employment contract. The employer wants to prevent

him from going to work for this rival so it files suit against him in
the Georgia Superior Court for the Augusta Judicial Circuit
seeking an interlocutory injunction-Georgia's version of a
preliminary injunction. 21 One of the reasons the plaintiff employer

files this action in a Georgia Superior Court is the vitality of
Georgia's flexible sliding-scale approach to weighing the four
factors in the jurisdiction's interlocutory injunction standard-the
factors that are considered by a Georgia Superior Court judge in
deciding whether to grant or deny provisional rehef.22 Assume
21 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(a) (2015). This hypothetical suit is not far-fetched. See, e.g., Holton
v. Physician Oncology Servs., LP, 742 S.E.2d 702, 702-03 (Ga. 2013) (interlocutory
injunction prohibiting a former employee from working with a competitor and violating noncompete and confidentiality agreements).
22 The four factors are that:
(1) there is a substantial threat that the moving party will suffer
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) the threatened injury
to the moving party outweighs the threatened harm that the injunction
may do to the party being enjoined; (3) there is a substantial likelihood that
the moving party will prevail on the merits of her claims at trial; and (4)
granting the interlocutory injunction will not disserve the public interest.
Bishop v. Patton, 706 S.E.2d 634, 638-39 (Ga. 2011) (citations omitted). The court is
allowed to balance the factors-there is a sliding scale. SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP v. Branch
Banking & Trust Co., 709 S.E.2d 267, 271 n.7 (Ga. 2011) (clarifying that moving party is
not required to prove all four factors, but instead court should consider and weigh each of
them). Personal jurisdiction is not an issue because the defendant employee lives across the
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next that this South Carolina defendant employee quickly removes
the case to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia based on diversity of citizenship. 23 There is no
doubt that Georgia's substantive law will be applied. 24 The
employee might prefer federal court for many reasons including
the Eleventh Circuit's traditional and rigorous four factor
standard for preliminary injunctive relief. 25
Specifically, the
preliminary injunction standard in the Eleventh Circuit is more
demanding than the interlocutory injunction standard used in
Georgia's Superior Courts because the Eleventh Circuit requires
the moving party to meet its burden of persuasion on each of the
factors, 26 while the moving party in Georgia benefits from a
27
balancing sliding-scale approach.

Savannah River in North Augusta, South Carolina and has been working at his employer's
Augusta, Georgia office for several years.
23 This case would be removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012) assuming the
amount in controversy requirement is satisfied because the parties are diverse and the
defendant is not a Georgia citizen.
24 See, e.g., Ferrero v. Associated Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1444-46 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the district court correctly applied Georgia's conflict of laws rule). Of course,
"the command of Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487... (1941) is that [the]
federal district court adjudicating a state law issue must apply the [substantive] law of the
forum state, including the state's choice-of-law rules." Sys. Operations, Inc. v. Scientific
Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977).
25 A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction in the Eleventh Circuit must establish (1)
that he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) that an
injunction is in the public interest. See, e.g., Osmose, Inc. v. Viance, LLC., 612 F.3d 1298,
1307 (11th Cir. 2010); Morgan Stanley DW, Inc. v. Frisby, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1374 (N.D.
Ga. 2001) (same). The plaintiff must clearly establish the burden of persuasion on all four
elements. Horton v. City of St. Augustine, 272 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001). Included
among the other reasons the defendant might want to be in federal court is a strategic
preference for the Federal Rules over Georgia's rules of practice and procedure; for example,
he might prefer the federal approach to jury selection, the tight management of the federal
docket, or having the case tried before an appointed Article I judge instead of an elected
judge. See YEAZELL, supra note 7, at 5 (describing strategic elements be calculated in
state/federal forum choice).
2 See, e.g., Osmose, Inc., 612 F.3d at 1307-08 (noting that district courts may only grant
preliminary injunction of all four criteria are established).
27 SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 709 S.E.2d 267, 271 n.7 (Ga.
2011) (clarifying that moving party is not required to prove all four factors, but instead
court should consider and weigh them).
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Given the differences between the standards, it is conceivable
that the plaintiff employer could obtain an interlocutory injunction
in the Superior Court for the Augusta Circuit but be unable to
obtain a preliminary injunction from the U.S. District for the
Southern District of Georgia sitting in Augusta. For example, the
Georgia court might be able to presume irreparable harm if the
plaintiff establishes it is likely that the defendant employee is
misappropriating proprietary information. Would the federal
court be able to make the same or a similar presumption? If the
balance of hardships tips decidedly in the plaintiffs favor, then a
Georgia court, using the state's flexible approach to balancing the
four factors, might grant an interlocutory injunction, even if the
plaintiff is only able to show serious questions going to the merits
instead of having to show the more demanding "substantial
likelihood of success on the merits."28 Would a federal district in
Georgia, applying the Eleventh Circuit standard, have to deny this
preliminary injunction if the plaintiff was only able to show
serious questions going to the merits even though the balance of
hardships tipped strongly in its favor?
A. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION GENERALLY

The injunction is a powerful judicial remedy. Backed by the
contempt power, it "is used to order defendants to engage in, or to
refrain from engaging in, an act (or acts)." 29 Some injunctions are
permanent, issued after the merits of a suit are fully tried and
determined, while others are temporary in nature including
and temporary
injunctions
or interlocutory
preliminary
restraining orders governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or comparable state rules of practice and
procedure. 30 These provisional orders are granted or denied before

28

Bishop v. Patton, 706 S.E.2d 634, 638-39 (Ga. 2011).

29

RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., REMEDIES: CASES, PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES

142 (2d ed. 2010).
3o Under Georgia's Civil Practice Act preliminary injunctions are called interlocutory
injunctions. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65 (2015); see also Bishop, 706 S.E.2d at 638 ("A permanent
injunction can be entered only 'upon a final decree.' An interlocutory injunction, by
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a final judgment based on a preliminary assessment of the facts
and the law by the court. 3 1 Notwithstanding the 'temporary,'
'preliminary,' 'provisional,' and 'interlocutory' labels, the decision
to grant or deny provisional relief often "will, as a practical matter,
end the case. For example, in many business transactions, market
conditions will mean that even a short delay makes the
32
transaction financially infeasible."
An influential commentator on legal and equitable remedies
states:
The central problem that gives rise to the need for
preliminary injunctions is the risk that plaintiff will be
irreparably injured before the slow processes of
litigation can reach a final decision. But the solution
to this problem has its own central problem: the court
is more likely to err when it acts on partial information
after a preliminary hearing, and such an error may
lead to an order that causes irreparable injury to
defendant.
The problem is how to manage these
33
competing risks.
This explanation underscores the extraordinary nature of the
preliminary injunction. Some courts refer to it as a drastic
remedy. 34 A provision in Georgia's civil practice act states that a
court's power to grant an interlocutory injunction "shall be

contrast, is a temporary remedy designed to pressure the status quo and keep the parties
from injuring one another until the court has had a chance to try the case.").
31 See, e.g., Bishop, 706 S.E.2d at 638 (describing how courts "confronted with a request
for an interlocutory injunction often will not have available all the evidence needed to fully
and finally adjudicate the parties' claims and defenses").
32

STEPHEN YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 319 (7th ed. 2008).

33 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS

353 n.2

(Concise 4th ed. 2012).
34 Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th
Cir. 2003) ("A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy...."
(citations omitted)); see also Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542
(1987) ("[A]n injunction is an equitable remedy that does not issue as of course.").

2016]

A TYPICAL UNGUIDEDERIE CHOICE

1179

prudently and cautiously exercised and, except in clear and urgent
35
cases, should not be resorted to."
The U.S. Supreme Court's most influential decision on the
federal standard for issuing a preliminary injunction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 is the 2008 ruling in Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 36 In reversing the grant of
a preliminary injunction that imposed limitations on the Navy's
sonar training in the Pacific Ocean near California, the Court
announced a four part test:
"A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish
that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in
37
the public interest."
This test has been interpreted to establish four separate criteria
that the plaintiff "must establish."38 Prior to Winter, however,
many federal courts treated the factors as establishing a balancing
test or a sliding scale: 39 If the claim appeared very strong on the
35 O.C.G.A. § 9-5-8 (2007).
36 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (providing the four criteria that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary
injunction must establish).
37 Id. at 20.
3'8 This reading of Winter is arguably based on the Supreme Court's 2006 ruling in eBay,
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., in which the Court announced a four factor test for permanent
injunctions that presented each factor as a separately required prong of a true test rather than
as factors in a balancing analysis. 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (holding that the district court and
Court of Appeals erred in categorically granting and denying injunctive relief without correctly
applying traditional four-factor framework governing injunctive relief). The four factor
approach to preliminary injunctions had, in contrast, traditionally been seen as involving a
process of weighing and balancing. Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The
Supreme Court's Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 203, 211-12, nn.35-41 (2012) (describing the "doctrinal straitjacket" that the eBay ruling
imposes on equity courts who had traditionally approached injunctive requests by weighing
the factors, i.e., a particularly strong showing on use factor can make up for an inadequate
showing on another factor); see also Jean C. Love, Teaching PreliminaryInjunctions After
Winter, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 689, 692-93 (2013) (discussing Winter's impact on the alternative
"sliding scale" approach to injunction relief).
:19LAYCOCK, supra note 33, at 354 n.3 ("[T]he overwhelming weight of authority in the
lower courts had been that these four factors are part of a balancing test or a sliding
scale."); Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 38, at 211, n.35 (describing previously
common approach in lower courts of balancing or sliding scale); Love, supra note 38, at 693,
nn.20-22 (citing cases using sliding scale approach).
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merits, then the plaintiff needed a lesser showing of irreparable
harm and the balance of hardships; or, if the balance of hardships
tipped decidedly in the plaintiffs favor, then he or she needed to
establish only that there are serious questions about the merits of
40
the claim.
Justice Ginsburg, who dissented in Winter along with Justice
Souter, emphasized that "[fllexibility is a hallmark of equity
jurisdiction. '4 1 She also said that "courts have evaluated claims
for equitable relief on a 'sliding scale,' sometimes awarding relief
based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood of success
is very high."42 Justice Ginsburg added that she believed that the
majority had not, in ruling against the injunction, rejected that
43
flexible formulation.

10 See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont'l Baking, Co., 526 F.2d 86, 88
(9th Cir. 1976) ("If the harm that may occur to the plaintiff is sufficiently serious, it is only
necessary that there be a fair chance of success on the merits."); Charlie's Girls, Inc. v.
Revlon, Inc., 483 F.2d 953, 954 (2d Cir. 1973) ("One moving for a preliminary injunction
assumes the burden of demonstrating either a combination of probable success and the
possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the balance of
hardships tips sharply in his favor.").
4' 555 U.S. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
43 Id.
42

('This Court has never rejected that formulation, and I do not believe it does so
today."). The Supreme Court's decision in Nken v. Holder, dealing with stays of deportation
orders, talks about judicial discretion and the importance of the circumstances of each case
while emphasizing that the possibility of success or the possibility of irreparable harm was
not enough. 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009) (" 'A Stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable
injury might otherwise result.' It is instead on 'an exercise of judicial discretion,' and '[t]he
propriety of its issue is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.' " (citations
omitted) (quotations omitted)); id. at 428 (noting that stay functionality overlaps with
injunction). Justices Kennedy and Scalia seemed to reject a balancing test in their
concurring opinion stating that "[wihen considering success on the merits and irreparable
harm, courts cannot dispense with the required showing of one simply because there is a
strong likelihood of the other." Id. at 438; LAYCOCK, supra note 33, at 345 n.5. Justices
Scalia and Ginsburg also disagreed about the appropriateness of the preliminary injunction
remedy in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo,S.A v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308
(1999). The issue concerned the power of the lower court to freeze assets pending the
adjudication of rights to those assets. Id. at 310. Justice Scalia, for the majority, said that
the court did not have this authority because such orders were not part of the equitable
powers conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Id. at 322-24. Justice Ginsburg, dissenting,
said that the order was consistent with the historic judicial discretion of courts to preserve
the status quo. Id. at 335. See generally Burbank, supra note 10, for a comprehensive
discussion of Grupo Mexicano and its implications.
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Notwithstanding Justice Ginsburg's belief, several circuits have
read Winter as repudiating the sliding scale or balancing
approach. 44 In contrast, other circuits are either unclear about the
impact of Winter,45 or have found a way to incorporate Winter into
46
their sliding scale approach.
While the nation's federal courts have been grappling with the
meaning of the U.S. Supreme Court's preliminary injunction
standard in Winter, the Georgia Supreme Court made it
abundantly clear to Georgia's trial courts that the standard for
'interlocutory' injunctions under Civil Practice Act section 9-1165(a) is flexible. 47 As recently as 2011, in Bishop v. Patton, the
48
state's highest court stated that a Georgia Superior Court's
determination is guided by four factors:

44 Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that
the "balance-of-hardship test may no longer be applied in granting or denying preliminary
injunctions in the Fourth Circuit, as the standard articulated in Winter governs"), vacated, 130
S. Ct. 2371 (2010), legal standardfor preliminary injunction reinstated, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir.
2010) (overturning lesser standard permitting balancing approach for the proper legal
standard articulated in Winter); Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1126-27 (9th Cir.
2009). But see Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011)
(holding that the sliding scale test remains viable after Winter).
15 Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (postponing
the issue).
46 Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins., Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725
(7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the movement must have plausible claims on all elements
articulated in Winter, but reducing ability to balance factors when one is stronger than
another); see also LAYCOCK, supra note 33, at 444 n.3 ('The Seventh Circuit easily assimilated
Winter to its existing sliding-scale standard....); Sarah J. Morath, A Mild Winter: The
Status of Environmental Preliminary Injunctions, 37 SEA'rLE U. L. REV. 155, 178 (2013)
(noting that while the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
considered the effect of Winter either explicitly or implicitly, only the Fourth has said that its
earlier standard was invalidated by Winter). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
has maintained its pre- Winter insistence that the plaintiff must clearly establish the burden of
persuasion as to all four elements, Horton v. City of St. Augustine, 272 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2001), including showing a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Osmose, Inc. v.
Viance, LLC., 612 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Morgan Stanley DW, Inc. v.
Frisby, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (same). Professor Love calls this the
"traditional" test for injunctive relief. Love, supra note 38, at 691.
47 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(a) (2015) uses, in contrast to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a),
the term "interlocutory" instead of "preliminary."
48 O.C.G.A. § 23-1-1 (1981) vests all equity jurisdiction in the Superior Courts.
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An interlocutory injunction should not be granted
unless the moving party shows that: (1) there is a
substantial threat that the moving party will suffer
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2)
the threatened injury to the moving party outweighs
the threatened harm that the injunction may do to the
party being enjoined; (3) there is a substantial
likelihood that the moving party will prevail on the
merits of her claims at trial; and (4) granting the
interlocutory injunction will not disserve the public
49
interest.
This test and its factors are similar to the federal standard
When the Georgia Supreme Court
announced in Winter.50
repeated this test in a subsequent opinion, however, it stated in a
footnote that "[t]o the extent that [the opinion in Bishop] may be
read as requiring the moving party to prove all four of these
factors to obtain an interlocutory injunction, it is hereby
disapproved."5' 1 In a nutshell, a flexible test with balancing is alive
and well in Georgia's courts while some federal circuits have
rejected this test and require the moving party to meet its burden
52
of persuasion on all four of the elements in the Winter standard.
Specifically, the preliminary injunction standard in the Eleventh
Circuit and Georgia's federal district courts seems more rigorous
than the interlocutory injunction standard in Georgia's Superior
Courts.
B. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

It is well established in the Eleventh Circuit that a
"preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy."5 3
Its purpose is "to preserve the relative positions of the parties until
49 706 S.E.2d 634, 638-39 (Ga. 2011).
50

Compare id., with Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 720 (2008) (listing four federal factors).

51 SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 709 S.E.2d 267, 271 n.7 (Ga.

2011).
52 See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
53 McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998).
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54
a trial on the merits," in other words, to maintain the status quo.
This form of temporary relief "is customarily granted on the basis
of procedures that are less formal and [on] evidence that is less
complete than [at] a trial."55 Evidence such as "affidavits and
hearsay materials which [might] not be admissible" at trial may be
admitted at a preliminary injunction hearing if "it 'is appropriate

given the character and objectives of the ... proceeding.'

"56

A federal district court in the Eleventh Circuit may grant a
preliminary injunction
only upon the movant's showing that (1) it has a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the
movant will suffer irreparable injury unless the
injunction is issued, (3) the threatened injury to the
movant outweighs the possible injury that the
injunction may cause the opposing party, and (4) if
issued, the injunction would not disserve the public
57
interest.
The moving party must clearly establish "the 'burden of
The requirement of
persuasion' as to all four elements."
irreparable harm or injury is another way of saying that the
remedy at law is inadequate.5 8 The Eleventh Circuit's standard

54 Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1323, 1339 (N.D.
Ga. 2010).
55 Id.
56 Id.

(citing and quoting from several Eleventh Circuit decisions).
Id. Horton v. City of St. Augustine, 272 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000)).
58 Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 356 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1972
('The very thing which makes an injury 'irreparable' is the fact that no remedy exists to
repair it.").
As a general rule, harm is irreparable when the legal remedy of damages is
inadequate to provide relief. Over the centuries, courts have decreed that
the legal remedy is inadequate in various situations: when property is
Iunique' so that plaintiff cannot readily purchase a substitute; when
damages are difficult or impossible to calculate; when defendant is
insolvent or it is otherwise impossible to collect a monetary judgment; when
plaintiff will be required to bring multiple proceedings to vindicate his
rights; and when the plaintiffs injury is of such a nature (e.g., deprivation
5
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was announced before the U.S. Supreme Court's 2008 decision in
Winter,59 and it has not been modified post-Winter.60 When a
federal district court's entry of a preliminary injunction is
reviewed, the court's findings of fact are subject to a clearly
61
erroneous standard, and conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.
The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction may be reversed
62
only upon a showing of abuse of discretion.
Osmose, Inc. v. Viance, LLC6 3 is an illustrative preliminary
injunction ruling from the Eleventh Circuit.
Osmose, Inc.
(Osmose), a wood preservative manufacturer, brought false
advertising claims under the Lanham Act alleging that Viance,
LLC (Viance), a competitor, had released several false statements
raising safety concerns about wood treated with Osmose's
preservative. 64 Viance counterclaimed alleging false advertising
by Osmose, and both sides moved for injunctive relief. 65 The
district court, after conducting a lengthy hearing, enjoined Viance
from making false or misleading statements critical of Osmose's
of civil rights) that the remedy of damages is substitutionary and
ineffective.
WEAVER ET AL., supra note 29, at 21-22; see also DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES 92 (2d
ed. 1993) (discussing the irreparability rule and explaining the debate over whether the test
restricts access to coercive remedies like the injunction). Cf. LAYCOCK, supra note 33, at
340 n.3 (discussing the meaning of the phrases irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at
law in respect to the grant of permanent injunctions). But see Gergen, Golden & Smith,
supra note 38, at 209 (explaining that, for permanent injunctions, the U.S. Supreme Court
seems to treat irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedy as separate requirements
and not redundant).
59 Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th
Cir. 2003) (stating four factor standard); Canal Auth. of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567,
573 (5th Cir. 1974) (discussing four prerequisites for a preliminary injunction); Morgan
Stanley DW, Inc. v. Frisby, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (identifying
standard and holding standard for granting a temporary restraining order is the same as
the standard for a preliminary injunction).
60 See, e.g., Amedisys Holding, LLC. v. Interim Healthcare of Atlanta, 793 F. Supp. 2d
1302, 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (requiring the plaintiff to establish the burden of persuasion on
all four elements).
61 Horton v. City of St. Augustine, Fla., 272 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001).
62 Id. at 1326. See, e.g., Osmose, Inc. v. Viance, LLC, 612 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir.
2010) (same).
63 612 F.3d at 1298.
61 Id. at 1302.
65

Id.
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technology. 66 Viance appealed and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
part of the order, vacated another part, and remanded so that the
district court could modify the injunction to alleviate First
Amendment concerns. 67 The Eleventh Circuit's opinion, typical of
many appellate court opinions reviewing a preliminary injunction
ruling, has a thorough presentation of the facts followed by a
factor by factor discussion of the lower court's ruling.
The court's discussion of the likelihood of success factor was
extensive and concluded that "the district court did not clearly err
in finding that Osmose demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
merits in its Lanham Act claim." 68 After a brief discussion of
whether it was still appropriate after the Supreme Court's decision
in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C. 69 to presume irreparable
harm when false advertising has been established, the court said it
did not have to resolve that issue because the district court had
not relied on a presumption of harm, and that "[e]ven in the
absence of a presumption, the district court's conclusion as to the
70
likelihood of irreparable harm was not an abuse of discretion."
Similarly, the lower court's finding that the defendant's "ads could
seriously damage Osmose's goodwill among consumers and the
treated wood industry while Viance would not be seriously harmed
because it could still publish its test results" was not an abuse of
discretion.7 1 Finally, the court said that the district court had not
abused its discretion in finding "that the public was served by
66 Id. at 1306-07.
67

Id. at 1303.

68 Id. at 1320.
69 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (this is the Supreme Court's leading decision on the standard for

granting permanent injunctions).
70 612 F.3d at 1320. In an earlier opinion the Eleventh Circuit had similarly declined to
consider whether irreparable injury could be presumed upon a finding of trademark
infringement and whether categorical rules that injunctive relief should follow a finding of
infringement were at odds with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006), which rejected a categorical rule in regard
to the grant of permanent injunctive relief in a patent infringement case. See N. Am. Med.
Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2008) (declining to
address whether a presumption of irreparable injury is equivalent to the categorized rules
rejected in eBay). See generally Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 38 (discussing the
eBay decision and its impact).
71 612 F.3d at 1321.
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preventing Viance from disseminating broad conclusions.., that
exceeded the findings of its studies because the public interest is
served by preventing customer confusion or deception." 72 The
appellate court remanded with instructions for the lower court to
make clear that the injunction's restrictions on Viance were
limited to commercial advertising or promotional statements so as
73
to be consistent with First Amendment principles.
74
Amedisys Holding, LLC v. Interim Healthcareof Atlanta, Inc.
is a representative trial court decision from the Northern District
of Georgia that applies the Eleventh Circuit's standard and
thoroughly explains its grant of a preliminary injunction.
Amedisys, a provider of home healthcare and hospice services,
sued Interim, its competitor, and three former employees who had
resigned to work for Interim. 75 They allegedly took confidential
materials and trade secrets with them in violation of several
federal statutes and Georgia's trade secrets act. Amedisys sought
a preliminary injunction to prohibit the defendants from using its
76
confidential, proprietary, and trade-secret information.
The court's two day hearing on the motion had live testimony,
and focused on the truthfulness of statements made by several of
the defendants. 77 The court provided a thorough discussion of its
factual findings and then made detailed conclusions on each of the

72 Id. The Eleventh Circuit vacated a portion of the preliminary injunction that prevented
Viance from claiming or implying that Osmose's process was not certified as an
Environmentally Preferable Product by Scientific Certification Systems because the lower
court had not identified any advertising in which the defendant made such claims. Id. at
1321-22 (holding that this aspect of the ruling was an abuse of discretion).
73 Id. at 1324. "[F]alse commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment," but
the literal terms of the injunction prohibited Viance from making claims in any settingcommercial and non-commercial. Id. at 1323.
74 793 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2011).
75 Id. at 1305.
76 Id. at 1305-06. The court first held a hearing for a temporary restraining order after
which it required defendants to refrain from using any of plaintiffs information, to return
certain materials to the plaintiff, and to have their computers examined. Id. at 1307. It
also told the parties to consider what discovery they would need for a preliminary
injunction hearing. Id. at n.4.
77 Id. at 1308-09 ("TIhe hearing focused on the truthfulness of the statements made by
[defendants]."). Other evidence included e-mail exchanges and text messages, as well as the
live testimony. Id.
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factors of the Eleventh Circuit's test. It found that Amedisys had
shown a substantial likelihood of success on its trade secret claim
against the competitor and one of the individual defendants,
Mack. 78 It found that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if
Mack were allowed to solicit patients from the doctors and
facilities listed in a misappropriated patient log, or if Interim
allowed her to do so. 79 The balance of hardships was found to
favor Amedisys if the former employee continued to compete
unfairly by using the misappropriated logs.8 0 Lastly, the court
stated that "[t]here is a strong public policy in favor of promoting
fair competition," and that allowing Mack to compete unfairly
81
undermined those policies.
This brief summary of two preliminary injunction decisions, one
from the Eleventh Circuit and one from the Northern District of
Georgia, underscores the requirement in the Eleventh Circuit that
the moving party must clearly establish each of the four elements.
"The burden of persuasion on all of the four requirements for a
82
preliminary injunction is at all times upon the plaintiff."
C. INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS IN GEORGIA'S SUPERIOR COURTS

Georgia is unique among the states in that many of the maxims
and principles of equity are codified, and this codification occurred
in the middle of the nineteenth century.8 3 Thomas R.R. Cobb,
David Irwin, and Richard Clark were the Commissioners charged
78

Id. at 1312-13.

79 Id. at 1313-14 ("Allowing Mack to continue to solicit business from the same doctors

and facilities will give Mack and Interim an unearned advantage in the marketplace and
will likely cause Amedisys to lose patients and referral sources.").
80 Id. at 1314. On the other hand, the court felt that this employee would not be harmed
by being prevented from competing unfairly, and Interim would not be hurt because it was
only prevented from allowing her to use misappropriated logs. She was still able to engage
in other meaningful work. Id.
81 Id. at 1315.
82 Id. at 1310 (quoting Canal Auth. of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir.
1974)). Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, handed down
by the court prior to close of business on September 30, 1981, are binding as precedent for
the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (1lth Cir. 1981).
83 Erwin C. Surrency, The Georgia Code of 1863 and Its Place in the Codification
Movement, 11 J. S. LEGAL HIST. 81, 93 (2003).
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by the Georgia legislature in 1858 to draft a code "which shall as
near as practicable, embrace in a condensed form, the Laws of
Georgia, whether derived from the Common Law, the
Constitutions of the State, the Statutes of the State, the Decisions
of the Supreme Court, or the Statutes of England of force in this
State."84 Cobb's charge was to draft the civil and penal laws.8 5 His
work on the Civil Code
reduced the general principles of equity into a
statutory form; the only time this was ever
accomplished in this country. During this period
equity was considered by the federal courts as a
separate system of law, with its own rules of practice.
The Alabama Code contains a section on chancery
practice, but not the principles of equity.
This
inclusion of equity principles was sanctioned under the
terms of the statute creating the commission .... At
this period, Georgia courts generally maintained a
separate equity docket, but the general principle was
that a litigant could not pursue an equitable remedy if
a remedy was provided by the civil law. No litigant
could be forced into the equity side of the court. Some
procedures used in equity practice were incorporated
in the Code, causing them to be merged into the
general law.
Examples include the procedure for
discovery and the extraordinary
remedies of
injunction, mandamus, and specific performance. The
Code preserved equity jurisdiction over charities,
fraud, and trusts. However, equity is clearly made
subordinate to law. One last provision pertaining to
equity stated that this branch of jurisprudence "as was
allowed and practiced in England" was a part of
86
Georgia law.

84

Acts of November 29, 1858, Ga. Laws 95.

85 Surrency, supra note 83, at 92, 95.
86 Id. at 93.
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Much of Cobb's work, codifying equity, remains intact today
with title 23 of the Georgia Code devoted largely to equity. This
88
87
title's sections set forth defenses like laches and clean hands,
and describe some of the traditional maxims like equity is
equality,8 9 or "[e]quity considers that done which ought to be
done," 90 while some of the title's sections are substantive. 9 1 In
addition, there are provisions in the Georgia Civil Practice Act
that address injunctive relief.92 For instance, section 9-5-1 is titled
"For what purposes injunctions may be issued," and states:
Equity, by a writ of injunction, may restrain
proceedings in another or the same court, a threatened
or existing tort, or any other act of a private individual
or corporation which is illegal or contrary to equity and
good conscience and for which no adequate remedy is
93
provided at law.
Subsequent provisions impose substantive limits on what a
Georgia court sitting in equity can accomplish. For instance,
equity should not interfere with the administration of criminal
law, 94 it should not restrain a trespass unless the injury is
irreparable or the trespasser is insolvent, 95 and equity will not
generally restrain "the breach of a contract for personal services
unless the services are of a peculiar merit or character and cannot

87

O.C.G.A. § 23-1-25 (1981).

- Id. §§ 23-1-10, -15.
- Id. § 23-1-9.
- Id. § 23-1-8.
9, See generally id. §§ 23-2-1 to -136 (providing, for example, grounds for equitable relief
in accident and mistake, fraud, accounting for funds, administration of assets generally,
powers of appointment and non-performance of contracts).
92 See generally O.C.G.A. §§ 9-5-1 to -11 (2007) (providing Georgia's statutory law on
injunctive relief).
93 Id. § 9-5-1.
m Id. § 9-5-2. See generally Owens v. Hill, 758 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 2014) (reversing a ruling
by the Fulton County Superior Court which granted an interlocutory injunction blocking
the execution of Warren Lee Hill utilizing drugs from a confidential source in order to
consider a constitutional issue).
95 O.C.G.A. § 9-5-4 (2007).
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be performed by others." 96 The Code also provides: "The granting
and continuing of injunctions shall always rest in the sound
discretion of the judge, according to the circumstances of each
case. This power shall be prudently and cautiously exercised and,
97
except in clear and urgent cases, should not be resorted to."
The specific rule on injunctions and restraining orders in
Georgia's Civil Practice Act, section 9-11-65, is similar to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65 in most respects. The most notable
difference is that a preliminary injunction is called an
98
interlocutory injunction under Georgia's version of 65(a).
Notwithstanding Georgia's codification of many principles and
standards of equity, the state's version of Rule 65, like Federal
Rule 65, does not set forth the standards for granting relief.
However, the Georgia's Code provisions on equity generally, and
injunctions specifically, provide some guidance to litigants and the
courts. In particular, the requirement of no adequate remedy at
law is codified,9 9 as is the principle that an injunction is an
extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in clear and
In addition, a court's authority to enter
urgent cases. 100
interlocutory decrees at any stage in a proceeding is codified. 10 1
Georgia's standard for interlocutory injunctions is similar to the
Eleventh Circuit's standard for preliminary injunctions. 10 2 The
interlocutory injunction in Georgia is an extraordinary, temporary
remedy that demands prudence and caution on the part of the
court that is hearing the motion. 10 The remedy is intended to
preserve or restore the status quo, and to keep the parties from
10 4
injuring each other until the case can be tried on the merits.
Georgia's highest court has pointed out that this prudence and
- Id. § 9-5-7.
97 Id. § 9-5-8.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(a) (2015) ("Interlocutory injunction.").
- O.C.G.A. § 9-5-1 (2007); O.C.G.A. §§ 23-1-3 to -4, 23-4-20 (1981).
100 O.C.G.A. § 9-5-8 (2007).
101 O.C.G.A. § 23-4-34 (1981).
102 See supra notes 36-52 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 111-16.
103 O.C.G.A- § 9-5-8 (1981).
104 Bishop v. Patton, 706 S.E.2d 634, 638 (Ga. 2011) (citing Chambers v. Peach Cnty., 492
S.E.2d 191 (Ga. 1997); Parker v. W. View Cemetery Ass'n, 24 S.E.2d 29 (Ga. 1943)); Bailey
v. Buck, 467 S.E.2d 554, 555 (Ga. 1996).
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caution is warranted because a judge who is considering a request
for an interlocutory injunction "often will not have available all the
evidence needed to fully and finally adjudicate the parties' claims
and defenses" since these motions for temporary relief are made
under serious time constraints, often before formal discovery has
started.105 As a result, the careful deliberation and reflection a
judge enjoys with a full trial on the merits is impossible. Instead,
the court has to make "a judgment call regarding the equities
presented." 10 6 The Code provides that the grant of a request for an
injunction "shall always rest in the sound discretion of the
judge. ' 10 7 This means that the ruling on the motion will not be
reversed on appeal absent an error of law, the absence of evidence
on an essential element, or an abuse of discretion.10 8 For example,
a court would be reversed if it based its ruling on a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the governing law, 109 or if it
attempted to bind persons who had not been made parties to the
action.110

105Bishop, 706 S.E.2d at 638.
' Id. The Georgia Supreme Court distinguished interlocutory and permanent injunctions
from temporary restraining orders (TROs) in a footnote and, citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(b),
explained that TROs last only thirty days and, unlike interlocutory injunctions, are not
immediately appealable as of right. Id. at 638 n.3. At the same time, unless otherwise
ordered an interlocutory injunction is not stayed during the pendency of an appeal. Sherman
v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 744 S.E.2d 26, 35 (Ga. 2013).
107 O.C.G.A. § 9-5-8 (2007). That discretion is abused when the record demonstrates that
the trial court failed to perform any substantive analysis of the merits or balancing of the
other equities in its decision to enter an interlocutory injunction, Bernocchi v. Forcucci, 614
S.E.2d 775, 777 (Ga. 2005), or when an injunction is granted without adequate notice to the
adverse party. Abel & Sons Concrete, LLC v. Juhnke, 757 S.E.2d 869, 871 (Ga. 2014).
108 Bishop, 706 S.E.2d at 638; see also Hampton Island Founders v. Liberty Capital, 658
S.E.2d 619, 623 (Ga. 2008); Davis v. VCP South, LLC, 774 S.E.2d 606, 612 (Ga. 2015);
Grossi Consulting, LLC v. Sterling Currency Grp., LLC, 722 S.E.2d 44, 46 (Ga. 2012). The
Bishop v. Patton opinion also notes that a trial court's findings and rulings on an
interlocutory injunction are not final and may be modified or even dissolved as the case
develops. 706 S.E.2d at 643. In addition, the denial of an interlocutory injunction does not
prevent the disappointed party from seeking interlocutory relief again as the circumstances
change. Id. See also Gwinnett Cnty. v. McManus, 755 S.E.2d 720, 722 (Ga. 2014).
109Lue v. Eady, 773 S.E.2d 679, 686 (Ga. 2015).
,,0 Barham v. City of Atlanta, 738 S.E.2d 52, 55-56 (Ga. 2013).
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Georgia's Superior Courts,'1 1 like their federal district court
counterparts, also evaluate four factors in ruling on motions for
interlocutory injunctions. But the sequence is not the same as the
Winter sequence and the factors, though very similar, do not have

identical wording. The four factor standard has been presented in
several relatively recent

decisions, including two from 2011:

Patton'1 2

Bishop v.
and SRB Investment Services, LLLP v. Branch
Banking & Trust Co. 113 In deciding whether to grant an injunction
the Superior Court shall consider whether:
(1) there is a substantial threat that the moving party
will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not
granted; (2) the threatened injury to the moving party
outweighs the threatened harm that the injunction
may do to the party being enjoined; (3) there is a
substantial likelihood that the moving party will
prevail on the merits of [its] claims at trial; and (4)
granting the interlocutory injunction will not disserve
114
the public interest.

," "All equity jurisdiction shall be vested in the superior courts of the several counties."
O.C.G.A. § 23-1-1 (1981).
112 706 S.E.2d 634 (Ga. 2011).
113709 S.E.2d 267 (Ga. 2011).
114 Id. at 271 (quoting Bishop v. Patton, 706 S.E.2d 634, 638-39 (Ga. 2011)).
It is
interesting to note that the Bishop opinion cites the Wright & Miller Federal Practice
treatise after it states the four factor standard along with citing two Georgia Supreme
Court decisions. 706 S.E.2d at 639. The minor differences between the preliminary
injunction test announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Winter and the interlocutory
injunction test in Georgia are as follows: Factor (1) from Winter is that the plaintiff must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits. This is Factor (3) in Georgia-the
moving party has to show a substantial likelihood that it will prevail on the merits of its
claims at trial. Compare Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (stating the four-factor test for an
interlocutory injunction), with SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP, 709 S.E.2d at 271 (stating Georgia's
four-factor test). The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the argument that a substantial
likelihood of success must be shown before an interlocutory injunction can be granted-a
lesser showing may be sufficient if other equitable factors weigh in the movant's favor. See,
e.g., Glen Oak, Inc. v. Henderson, 369 S.E.2d 736, 738 (Ga. 1988) ("[Tlhe possibility that the
party obtaining a preliminary injunction may not win on the merits at the trial does not
determine the property or validity of the trial court's granting the preliminary injunction.");
Zant v. Dick, 294 S.E.2d 508, 509 (Ga. 1982) ("[Tlhe grant or denial of an interlocutory
injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge according to the circumstances of
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The Georgia Supreme Court's 2011 opinion in SRB Investment
Services, LLLP further defines Georgia's test with the following
statement: "To the extent that our opinion in Bishop v.
Patton... may be read as requiring the moving party to prove all
four of these factors to obtain an interlocutory injunction, it is
11 5
hereby disapproved."
This footnote supports the proposition that there is a
substantial difference between the Georgia and Eleventh Circuit
standards. It stands in sharp contrast to the Eleventh Circuit's
statement that the moving party must "clearly establish[ ] the

each case." (citations omitted)). The flip side is that the court can deny the requested relief
if it appears unlikely that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of his or her claim. Coffey
v. Fayette Cnty., 610 S.E.2d 41, 42 n.6 (Ga. 2005). Factor (2) in Winter is that the plaintiff
must establish that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief. This is Factor (1) in Georgia-the moving party must show there is a substantial
threat that it will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. SRB Inv. Servs.,
LLLP, supra. According to the Georgia Supreme Court, this factor-substantial threat of
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted-is the most important one. Bishop, 706
S.E.2d at 639; see also Hobbs v. Peavy, 82 S.E.2d 224, 227 (Ga. 1954) (holding that a
plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show that he is in great danger of suffering an
imminent injury for which he does not have an adequate and complete remedy at law). See
generally supra note 58 (explaining that the irreparable harm requirement is another way
of saying that the remedy at law is inadequate). Factor (3) in Winter is that the plaintiff
must establish that the balance of equities tips in his favor. Winter, supra. Factor (2) in
Georgia parallels this showing: the moving party has to show that the threatened injury to
it if the injunction is not granted outweighs the threatened harm that the injunction may do
to the party being enjoined. SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP, supra. "In determining whether to
preserve the status quo by [granting the injunction, the] trial court must balance the
conveniences of the parties pending the final adjudication, with consideration being given to
whether greater harm might come from granting the injunction or denying it." Cotton
States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stephen Brown Ins. Agency, Inc., 660 S.E.2d 445, 448 (Ga. Ct. App.
2008). This is the balance of hardships factor in Georgia. Factor (4) in Winter is that the
plaintiff must establish that an injunction is in the public interest.
Winter, supra.
Similarly, Factor (4) in Georgia is showing that the injunction will not disserve the public
interest. Bishop, 706 S.E.2d at 639.
115 709 S.E.2d at 271 n.7 (citation omitted); see also Jansen-Nichols v. Colonial Pipeline Co.,
764 S.E.2d 361, 362 (Ga. 2014) ("Although one seeking interlocutory injunctive relief need not
always 'prove all four of these factors,' . . . a trial court must keep in mind that 'an
interlocutory injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and the power to grant it must be
prudently and cautiously exercised.' " (citation omitted)). In a sense these statements
reconfirm in part an earlier decision in which the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the
argument that a substantial likelihood of success must be shown before an interlocutory
injunction can be granted-a lesser showing may be sufficient if other equitable factors weigh
in the movant's favor. See, e.g., Glen Oak, Inc., 369 S.E.2d at 738; Zant, 294 S.E.2d at 509.
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'burden of persuasion' as to all four elements."11 6 This means that
in Georgia "a trial court is not required to find that a movant is
likely to succeed on the merits before granting an interlocutory
injunction, under certain circumstances where other equitable
factors counsel in favor of the grant."117 There is no uncertainty
about the good health of the sliding scale or balancing approach to
the grant or denial of interlocutory injunctions in Georgia's equity
jurisprudence.
The decision in Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County v.
Stiles Apartments, Inc.118 illustrates the flexible nature of
Georgia's four factor standard. This suit concerned parking spaces
constructed in 1954 by Stiles Apartments pursuant to an
agreement with the City of Athens-now called the Unified
Government of Athens-Clarke County (ACC). 11 9 About two-thirds
of each space is on land owned by Stiles in fee simple. 120 The
spaces and adjoining sidewalk are maintained by ACC. 12 1 After
Stiles received complaints from its commercial tenants about the
spaces being used by non-customers and that cars were being left
for several days, it attempted to have cars towed only to be stopped
by an ACC attorney. 122 He said that the spaces were for the
general public, not just the customers of Stiles' tenants. 23 Then,
after losing some tenants and learning that ACC was planning to
install meters and start regular patrols, Stiles obtained an
interlocutory injunction that blocked the city from exercising any
control over the parking spaces until there could be final
resolution of "whether the parties to the 1954 agreement intended
to create or reserve public property rights in the land owned by
116 Horton v. City of St. Augustine, 272 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 20.01) (emphasis added)
(citing and quoting Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000)).
117 Toberman v. Larose Ltd., 637 S.E.2d 158, 161 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (interpreting the
Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Zant v. Dick, 294 S.E.2d 508 (Ga. 1982)).
118 723 S.E.2d 681 (Ga. 2012).
119 Id.
at 682.
120 Id.
121 Id.
The agreement with ACC provides that at least every seven years Stiles closes the
parking area temporarily "to prevent the public from obtaining prescriptive rights to that
portion of the property that Stiles[ ] owns in fee simple." Id.
122
123

Id.
Id.
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Stiles Apartments, thereby giving the authority to control who can
or cannot use the parking area to ACC. ' '124 This injunction was
intended to maintain the status quo-no meters and no patroluntil the respective property rights of Stiles and ACC could be
125
determined.
The Georgia Supreme Court, in affirming, went through a
factor by factor discussion somewhat similar to how the Eleventh
Circuit assesses federal district court rulings on preliminary
injunctions. In regard to the first factor, the court said that harm
is deemed irreparable where an interest in land is threatened due
to the unique character of real property. 126 In addition, ACC's plan
to install meters, start regular patrols, and issue citations was
127
seen as altering the status quo and causing great harm to Stiles.
The status quo was defined as the parking area being used by the
patrons of Stiles' commercial tenants. 128 This implicated the
second factor: the threatened harm to Stiles without relief
129
outweighed the possible harm an injunction might cause ACC.
In regard to the public interest, the Court agreed with the trial
court's finding that the injunction would not disserve the public
interest because a "government entity depriving a private entity of
its property without the due process of law can rarely ...be in the
130
public interest."
The Georgia Supreme Court had a relatively full discussion of
whether Stiles was substantially likely to prevail on the merits. It
said that the trial court had found that the 1954 agreement did not

124
125

Id. at 682-83.
Id. at 683.

126 Id.
(citing Westpark Walk Owners, L.L.C. v. Stewart Holdings, L.L.C., 655 S.E.2d 254,
257 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)). This is a traditional, long-recognized presumption in equity. It is
uncertain whether such a categorical presumption is still permissible under federal equity
practice, at least in regard to permanent injunctions, after the decision in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). See also N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom
Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing how eBay calls into
question whether courts may presume irreparable harm where a plaintiff has demonstrated
a likelihood of success on the merits).
127 723 S.E.2d at 683.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. (quoting from the trial court's ruling).
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express an intention that the parking area was intended for public
use; and it emphasized that Stiles retained title to the property,
that it had paid for the construction of the parking spaces, had
been paying taxes through the years on the entire property, and
that these and other factors "support[ed] the conclusion that the
parties.., had no intention of creating or reserving public
property rights in the land owned by Stiles."1 31 The Georgia
Supreme Court acknowledged that there may have been evidence
supporting ACC's interpretation of the contract, but determined
that there was sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's
finding regarding the plaintiffs likelihood of success on the
merits.132 The Court concluded by saying that ACC "may yet
prevail on its claim" about the 1954 agreement, but that the trial
court had accepted the evidence introduced by Stiles as
authorizing the grant of the injunction. 133 This was not a manifest
134
abuse of its discretion.
The Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Great American
Dream, Inc. v. DeKalb County is a rare reversal of a trial court's
denial of an interlocutory injunction. 135 Great American, Inc. d/b/a
Pin Ups Night Club (Pin Ups) is an establishment in DeKalb
County with restaurant and liquor licenses as well as nude
dancing.136 Under these licenses it had to stop serving alcohol
each day at the time required by local ordinances. 137 It then
offered breakfast service until closing at 7:00 am, and would

131 Id.

132Id.
133Id.
134 Id.

It is immaterial that there also may have been evidence before the trial
court that [favored the contract interpretation argued by ACC]. All that is
material on appeal is that there is evidence which supports the trial court's
finding that [the parties did not intend to create public property rights in
the parking area]. Where the evidence is conflicting, "it [cannot] be said
that the court abused its discretion in either granting or denying the
injunction."
Id. (citing Bailey v. Buck, 467 S.E.2d 554, 556 (Ga. 1996))135 727 S.E.2d 667, 667 (Ga. 2012).
136 Id.
137Id. at 667-68.
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reopen at 9:00 am. 138 In June of 2010, the DeKalb Board of
Commissioners amended its ordinances so that establishments
like Pin Ups would have to close and be clear of customers "one
hour after the end of the legal period for selling alcohol," and that
they could not reopen until 9:00 am. 139 Pin Ups alleged that the
new ordinances violated its free-speech rights under the Georgia
Constitution and sued to enjoin operation of the new ordinances. 140
The Superior Court, after balancing the equities, denied the
interlocutory injunction.1 4 1 It stated that an injunction blocking
operation of the new ordinances would alter the status quo
because Pin Ups already was complying with the new
ordinances-the status quo was compliance. 142 It also said that
Pin Ups had an adequate remedy at law since an award of
damages would compensate for any loss of income. 143 Finally, the
trial court characterized the petition as raising due process
concerns and concluded that the ordinances met the rational basis
test.144 It thus found that Pin Ups had little likelihood of success
45
on the merits.1
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 14 holding
that the trial court erred in applying the rational basis test and
determining that plaintiff had little likelihood of success on the
merits. 147 It said that Pin Ups had alleged a violation of freespeech rights protected by the Georgia Constitution, noted that
Georgia's protection of free speech is broader than that provided by
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and said that

138

Id. at 668.

139 Id.

140 Id. at 668-69. It also sought declaratory relief and damages. Id. at 668 n.4 (stating
that Pin Ups estimated it would lose $2,000 per week in breakfast sales). Nude dancing is
recognized as expressive conduct under Georgia's free speech clause, Harris v. Entm't Sys.,
Inc., 386 S.E.2d 140, 141-42 (Ga. 1989), and the new ordinances limited this activity by
requiring the establishment to close. 727 S.E.2d at 668-69.
'4, 727 S.E.2d at 668.
142 Id. at 670 n.8.
143 Id. at 670.
144 Id. at 668.
145

Id.

146 Id. at 667.
117

Id. at 669.
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content-neutral ordinances that incidentally affect protected
expression have to undergo more than a rational basis test.148 In
regard to the lower court's determination that Pin Ups had an
adequate remedy at law for damages, the Georgia Supreme Court
said that the loss of free-speech rights, even for minimal periods of
time, constitutes irreparable harm for which damages are
inadequate. 149 Finally, in response to the trial court's finding that
the status quo was compliance with the new ordinances, the
Supreme Court indicated that there was no authority for the
"proposition that a party must either violate [the] law it is
challenging or forfeit its claim" for an injunction. 150 On remand
the trial court was to evaluate the plaintiffs request under the
correct legal standard. 151
This summary of two Georgia Supreme Court decisions on
interlocutory injunctions underscores the flexible nature of
Georgia's standard. In the Stiles Apartments case, the Court
presumed irreparable harm because the owner's interests in real
property were threatened by ACC's proposed action. 152 Similarly,
it said that it is rarely in the public interest for a government
entity to deprive a person of property without due process. 153 In
regard to the landowner's likelihood of success on the merits it
acknowledged that ACC might ultimately prevail on its
interpretation of the 1954 agreement but said there was sufficient
evidence supporting the Superior Court's ruling. 154 In essence, a
Georgia trial court is not required to find that the moving party
has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits before
granting an interlocutory injunction where other factors counsel in
favor of the provisional relief. 155 In Great American Dream, the
DeKalb County nude dancing case, the Court, in reversing, was

148

Id.

149

Id.

at 670.

Id. at 670 n.8.
151 Id. at 670.
152 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
153 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
154 See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
155 Glen Oak, Inc. v. Henderson, 369 S.E.2d 736, 738 (Ga. 1988); Zant v. Dick, 294 S.E.2d
508, 509 (Ga. 1982); Toberman v. Larose Ltd., 637 S.E.2d 158, 161 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
150
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willing to presume irreparable harm since free speech rights were
at issue, and said there was no authority for the proposition that a
person had to violate a law or forfeit his right to seek injunctive
relief. The Court concluded that the lower court applied the wrong
standard in evaluating the strip club's likelihood of success on the
merits. It did not say that Pin Ups would win on its free speech
challenge but the Court's discussion of the several factors makes
clear that it regarded the establishment's claim for an
interlocutory injunction to be fairly strong. 156

III. ERIE RAILROAD v. TOMPKINS AND THE DIFFERENT STANDARDS
The hypothetical lawsuit described earlier 157 presents the Erie
doctrine issue that is the focus of this Article. A suit has been
removed to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia based on diversity. It is an employment
dispute involving an employee who is a citizen of South Carolina
that is jumping ship to one of his employer's competitors. The
employer, a Georgia company, fears that he is misappropriating
customer lists and other proprietary information. There is no
doubt that Georgia's substantive law will apply. 158 The employer
filed originally in a Georgia Superior Court in part because of the
vitality of the state's flexible, sliding scale approach to weighing
the four factors for provisional relief. 159 The defendant removed
the case to federal court for a number of reasons, including the
Eleventh Circuit's more rigorous approach to weighing those four
factors. Given the differences between the respective standards, it
is possible that the plaintiff could obtain an interlocutory
injunction in the Superior Court for the Augusta Judicial Circuit
but be unable to obtain a preliminary injunction from the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia sitting in
See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
'8 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
159 See, e.g., Ferrero v. Associated Materials Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1444 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding when employee sues in state court, defendant employer removes, both sides seek a
preliminary injunction, that relief is granted and the Eleventh Circuit holds that the
district court correctly applied Georgia's conflict of laws rule).
156

157
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Augusta.160 Does the federal court have to apply the Georgia
standard or should it go with the Eleventh Circuit's standard?
A. SCHOLARLY COMMENTARY ON THE ISSUE

Leading authorities on federal practice and procedure are not in
agreement on the application of the Erie doctrine when injunctive
relief is sought in federal court, but they appear to be in
agreement that the U.S. Supreme Court has not resolved the
issue.161
Accordingly, the Erie doctrine choice-of-law issue
resulting from the differences between the Eleventh Circuit and
62
Georgia standards merits careful and thorough analysis.
A leading civil procedure treatise states that:
whatever the relevance of state law in a diversity action
involving a request for permanent injunctive relief, it
seems clear that plaintiff should be able to obtain a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction
to preserve the status quo even though he is suing to

enforce a state right and those devices are not provided
for by the forum's law or are available only upon a
different showing than is requiredunder Rule 65.163

See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 894 F. Supp. 2d 691, 704 (E.D. Va.
2012) (stating that the scholarly works on this subject illustrate "the extant, rather broadly
based, disagreement respecting the meaning of York and the application of Erie when
injunctive relief is sought in federal court where the plaintiff has proved that the defendant
has violated a state statute that authorizes injunctive relief. Those works also illustrate the
divergence of decisional authority respecting the topic.').
162 Professor Burbank, in discussing the Erie doctrine issues raised in Grupo Mexicano,
said that the decision "does not clearly leave it open to [federal courts] to grant provisional
injunctive relief when such relief is authorized by state law." Burbank, supra note 10, at
1344. In a footnote he adds that "the Court would have to make a bunch of mistakes in
order to [foreclose] application of state law, including holding that Rule 64 does not apply to
injunctions and that 'under Rule 65' a federal court is not required to follow state law
160
161

authorizing provisional injunctive relief." Id. at 1344 n.285.
163 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 2943, at 78 (emphasis added); see also id. § 4513, at
443-44 n.64 (explaining that a party may be able to get a preliminary injunction to preserve
the status quo in a diversity case though state law may not allow it).
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The treatise reaches this conclusion because Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 is on point and should control, and because
preliminary injunctions, as provisional relief, do not substantially
impair state interests since they are not permanent but are of
limited duration.1 64 Another section of this treatise states:
[T]he federal courts are free to follow the practices and
procedures authorized under the Federal Rules or an
Act of Congress, despite the fact that a particular
practice or procedure might not be available in a state
court and might be viewed as "remedial." Thus the
absence of a corresponding procedure or remedy in the
forum state's court system does not affect the ability of
a federal court in a diversity case to do any of the
following: ... to issue a preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order under Rule 65.165
This section also includes the following statement:
Unless a Federal Rule ...clearly is applicable, the
Rules of Decision Act as interpreted by Erie and its
progeny constrains whatever inherent equitable and
remedial powers federal courts possess .... In
addition, an independent federal law of remedies
would be contrary to the twin aims of Erie as described
in the Hanna decision. The existence of that law
would encourage litigants to shop between federal and
state fora and would give rise to disparate treatment
among litigants. 166
These statements reflect the fact that Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 167 in announcing what came
to be known as the "outcome determinative test,"'6 8 was not
164Id. § 2943, at 78-80.
165Id. § 4513, at 442-43.
166 Id.
at 446.
167326 U.S. 99 (1945).
168 FREER,

supra note 13, at 527.
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especially clear in defining the equitable powers of federal courts
hearing diversity cases. 6 9
Professor Cross writes that
Frankfurter's opinion in York suggests "that federal courts could
often diverge from state law in equity, especially on questions of
remedy" but that the Justice did not explain the source of this
prerogative. 170 Professor Cross explains that this aspect of the
York opinion is hard to reconcile "with the basic principle of
limited federal judicial authority set out in the remainder of the
opinion."171
Another treatise on federal practice and procedure states the
familiar principle that if a Federal Rule is on point, the standard
for determining whether the Rule applies notwithstanding a
"conflicting state law derives not from the Rules of Decision Act
but rather from the Rules Enabling Act." 172 This treatise then
points out that Rule 65 "does not itself authorize injunctive
relief."' 173 Accordingly, if state law precludes injunctive relief in
regard to a state law created claim, then the federal court is
precluded from granting an injunction absent a superseding
174
federal statute.
Professor Crump's thorough analysis of the equity jurisdiction
of the federal courts and the Erie doctrine says that there is a
"muddled soup of inconsistent principles that characterizes the
Court's handling of the Erie problem," and that when ruling on
requests for injunctive relief "[t]here is a body of decisions that
follow federal law, and there is a group that adopts state law.' 7 5
Professor Cross says that "court decisions that involve an actual
conflict between state and federal law are split."176 Most courts
look to state law for rules governing defenses like laches and

WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4513, at 439.
Cross, supra note 9, at 174.
171 Id. Professor Cross also explains that because differences in remedy affect the outcome
of cases, many courts conclude that state law must be followed, but he also says that other
courts rely on York and do not feel bound by state rules on remedies. Id. at 190-91.
169
170

172

13 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.07[21 (3d ed. 2015).

173

Id.

174 Id.
175

Crump, supra note 9, at 1241-42.

176

Cross, supra note 9, at 189.
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unclean hands, and many turn to state law on questions of
remedy. 177 Some courts offer no rationale for this choice, while
others explain that "because differences in remedy directly affect
the outcome of litigation, the Supreme Court's later Erie cases
mandate use of state law."178 However, other courts rely on other
statements from York and hold that they are not bound by state
179
rules dealing with equitable remedies.
In a nutshell, leading civil procedure authorities are not in
agreement on the application of the Erie doctrine when injunctive
relief is sought in a federal court sitting in diversity.
B. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT ON THE ISSUE

The Eleventh Circuit grappled with the choice between Georgia
0
law and Federal Rule 65 in Ferrero v. Associated Materials Inc.18
Ferrero, a former employee of Associated Materials, Inc., sued in a
Georgia Superior Court for declaratory and injunctive relief
against his former employer after it had announced its intention to
enforce a covenant not to compete.1 8 l The defendant employer
removed the case on the basis of diversity the day after it was
filed, filed a counterclaim, and then obtained a preliminary
injunction against Ferrero's plan to work for a competitor in
Ferrero filed an appeal. 8 3
violation of the covenant.182
Meanwhile, the district court 'blue penciled' the covenant to
restrict him from competing in two counties for a period of
84
eighteen months. 1
One of the issues on appeal was whether the court should have
applied Georgia law to determine the appropriateness of the
A Georgia statute then in effect
preliminary injunction. 8 5
permitted enforcement of some contracts in restraint of trade and
177
178
179

Id. at 190.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 190.

Ms923 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1991).
181Id. at 1443.
182

Id. at 1443-44.

183Id. at 1444.
184
185

Id.
Id. at 1448.
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some covenants not to compete, and presumed injunctive relief to
be an appropriate remedy for violations of these agreements-in
essence, an injunction should issue in most cases. 186 The Eleventh
Circuit noted, in contrast, that federal law allows preliminary
injunctions to issue only when the moving party established the
standard's four factors.18 7 There was no presumption under
federal law that an injunction is an appropriate remedy for
18 8
violation of a covenant not to compete.
The court said it was "clear that the outcome of this threshold
choice of law question could lead to an outcome determinative
result."18 9 The court cited the Wright & Miller treatise, discussed
the Supreme Court's decision in Hanna v. Plumer,190 and stated
that:
federal courts are required to apply the federal rules of
civil procedure to the exclusion of any contrary state
procedure as long as the rule is both constitutional and
within the scope of the rules' enabling act.... As
previously noted, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65
incorporates traditional federal equity practice. We
hold that rule 65 meets the criteria of Hanna, and
therefore we apply federal procedure to determine
whether the preliminary injunction was properly
issued. 191

186 Id. (discussing O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2.1(g)(1)). But see Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, 878
F. Supp. 1224, 1243 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (discussing Ferrero but misreading this Georgia
statute as presuming. that the injunctions were inappropriate remedies that should issue
only in limited cases).
187923 F.2d at 1448.
188

Id.

189 Id.

M 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
191Ferrero, 923 F.2d at 1448 (citations omitted). This ruling arguably favored Ferrero
because he was trying to argue that Associated Materials Inc. had not shown likelihood of
success on the merits or irreparable harm. Id. at 1448-49. Moreover, he said he was
damaged more by the injunction than Associated would have been had the injunction been
denied. Id. In short, he did not want the trial court to apply the Georgia presumption in
favor of injunctive relief. See also Curtis 1000, Inc., 878 F. Supp. at 1244 (holding that Rule
65 controlled for the same reason citing Ferreroas authority).
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The court then engaged in a factor by factor analysis and
affirmed the district court's determination that Associated
192
Materials Inc. was entitled to a preliminary injunction.
Specifically, the employer had shown a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits, irreparable harm, that it would be damaged
more without the injunction than Ferrero would be harmed by
being enjoined, and that the public interest favored the
employer. 19 3 The court also said that the lower court's conclusion
that the public interest favored the employer was evidenced by
Georgia's presumption that injunctive relief was appropriate for
94
violations of this kind of restrictive covenant. 1
Ferrerowas cited in 2008 by a federal district court in Florida
for the proposition that federal procedural law governs under
Hanna "even when the standard for an injunction in state court is
more permissive than federal court." 195 The plaintiff sued a credit
union, alleging that it had converted his funds and failed to pay
him according to a contract. 9 6 He argued that state law controlled
and that under a Florida statute courts could, under certain
circumstances, enjoin a "theft" without the moving party having to
show irreparable harm. 19 7 The trial court disagreed. 19 It said the
case was in federal court and subject to federal procedural law,
showing irreparable harm is the "sine qua non of injunctive relief,"
and that the plaintiffs possible injury could be undone through an
award of damages. 9 9 In essence, notwithstanding the state
statute, the plaintiff still had to establish irreparable harm. He

192

923 F.2d at 1449.

193 Id.
194 Id.
195 England v. USA Fed. Credit Union, 2008 WL 660294, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2008).
The claim was filed initially in the Orange County Circuit Court and removed to federal
court. Id. at *1.
196Id. at *1.
'91 Id. at *2 n.3 ("Section 812.035 of the Florida Statutes allows Florida courts to enjoin a
theft under section 812.014 without a showing of irreparable harm to the movant.").
"1 Id. at *2.
99 Id.
at *1-2. The plaintiff also failed to show a substantial likelihood of prevailing on
the merits. Id. at *2.
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had an adequate remedy at law-damages-so injunctive relief
200
was not warranted.
These two decisions resolved the Erie doctrine question the easy
way: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 incorporates traditional
federal equity practice and is on point, Rule 65 is valid, and, under
Hanna, Rule 65 controls. There were no in-depth discussions on
forum shopping, inequitable administration of the law, and the
possibility that applying the federal standard instead of the state
standard might have an impact on the outcome of the litigation.
After all, courts have noted that a preliminary injunction is often
"so inextricably interwoven with the substantive right invaded
that the denial of the remedy would be tantamount to the denial of
20 1
the right."
C. OTHER JUDICIAL RULINGS ON THE ISSUE

Courts in other federal circuits also have concluded that federal
law controls but not necessarily by following the same rationale as
the Eleventh Circuit in Ferrero. For instance, in Southern Milk
Sales, Inc. v. Martin the Sixth Circuit reviewed the denial of a
preliminary injunction sought by an agricultural cooperative to
block certain persons from interfering with milk marketing
agreements. 20 2 The choice-of-law question was whether Michigan
or federal law applied to the plaintiffs request for injunctive
relief.20 3 The plaintiff contended that a Michigan statute titled
"Persons Liable for Damage for Encouraging Breach of Contracts
and Agreements" controlled and that the only prerequisite to
issuing a preliminary injunction was showing that this statute had
been violated. 20 4 It argued that the moving party did not have to
establish the other prerequisites for injunctive relief. 20 5 The court

Id. at *2.
Port of N.Y. Auth. v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745, 753 (E.D.N.Y.1966); accord
Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals & Materials Corp., 321 F. Supp. 923, 931 n.14
(N.D. Cal. 1970) (same).
202 924 F.2d 98, 98 (6th Cir. 1991).
203 Id. at 101.
204 Id. at 102 (citing and discussing MICH. COMP.LAWS § 450.109).
205 Id.
200

201
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said that this choice-of-law issue was not settled merely because of
Rule 65, and that it was necessary to ask whether the scope of that
206
rule "is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court."
The court then stated that
Rule 65 does not provide explicit guidance as to the
factors to be considered when making a preliminary
injunction decision. We have looked, therefore, to
general equitable principles in establishing the
standards used to measure the appropriateness of
granting a preliminary injunction under Rule
65.... Consequently, we have filled the interstices of
Rule 65 in such a way as to address the question
involved in this case: whether the facts compel the
granting of a preliminary injunction. To determine
whether we are bound to apply state law under these
circumstances we turn to the methodology adopted in
20 7
Hanna v. Plumer.
The court said that the lessons from Hanna required it to defer
to state law unless some important federal interest was involved:
"for example, where the matter is one of procedure rather than
substance. '20 8 The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 20 9 for this proposition and proceeded
to discuss the Michigan statute. 210 The court was inclined to
accept the trial court's determination that the statute applied only
to permanent injunctions, and concluded that this really did not
matter because "the issue in question is procedural" since the
purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo
until trial on the merits. 21 ' In short, federal law controlled

206

Id. at 101 (citing and quoting from Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50

(1980)).
207 Id. at 102 (citations omitted).
208

Id.

20

326 U.S. 99 (1945).

210

Id.

211

S. Milk Sales, Inc. v. Martin, 924 F.2d 98, 102 (6th Cir. 1991).
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because the concerns that guide the court in applying Rule 65 are
2 12
essentially procedural.
The Fourth Circuit faced a similar choice-of-law problem in
2 13
Capital Tool & Manufacturing v. Maschinenfabrik Herkules.
The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to prevent a former
employee from working for a competitor and using trade secrets in
violation of Virginia's trade secrets statute. 214 It argued that it did
not have to show irreparable harm as a prerequisite for provisional
relief because it was invoking state law, and that state law
controlled under Erie.215 The lower court denied the preliminary
injunction and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 216 It agreed that
under Virginia law the complaining party did not have to allege or
prove irreparable harm when it invokes a statute authorizing
2 17
injunctive relief; it only has to prove a violation of the statute.
The problem with the plaintiffs argument was that it did not
recognize the difference between preliminary and permanent
injunctions. 2 18 The Fourth Circuit said that "[t]here is no reason to
exclude from Erie state substantive law regarding the issuance of
final injunctions." 219 The court continued:
But the purpose of a preliminary, as opposed to a final
injunction "is merely to preserve the relative positions
of the parties until a trial on the merits can be
held.".. . Typically-and this is a typical case-the
parties do not provide the court sufficient information
to decide the merits of the case when application is
made for a preliminary injunction. For this reason a
district court must balance the hardship the parties

212

Id.

213

837 F.2d 171 (4th Cir. 1988).

214

Id.

215

Id. at 172.

Id. at 171.
217 Id. at 172.
216

218

Id.

219 Id.

The court based this statement on Erie's criticism of the infamous Black & White
Taxicab Co. case which had upheld a permanent federal injunction that would have been
denied by a state court under the law of the forum state. Id. (citations omitted).
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will suffer pending trial according to the factors set
220
forth in Blackwelder FurnitureCo. v. Seilig Mfg. Co.
The court said Blackwelder's principles applied to diversity
cases, that there were not significant differences between the
federal and Virginia standards for preliminary injunctions, and
that the plaintiff was not entitled to a preliminary injunction as a
221
matter of right.
Which approach is correct? Does federal law control because
Rule 65 is directly on point? Does federal law control because the
grant or denial of these provisional injunctions is essentially
procedural?
Does federal law control because a preliminary
injunction, unlike a permanent injunction, merely maintains the
status quo until there can be a trial on the merits? Are there other
reasons to support adhering to the application of the federal
preliminary injunction standard in diversity cases in states like
Georgia that use a balancing or sliding scale approach to the grant
of a preliminary injunction, or should federal district courts apply
the state standard in those situations?
IV. APPLYING THE SEVERAL ERIE DOCTRINE TESTS
A. IS THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD SUBSTANCE OR
PROCEDURE?

Notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit's conclusion in Southern
Milk Sales,222 the question of whether a state's preliminary or
interlocutory injunction standard should be applied instead of the
federal standard cannot be answered by simply concluding that
the issue is procedural. The Sixth Circuit's ruling was based on
223
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Guaranty Trust Co.
However, Guaranty Trust Co. put an end to the simple substance
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 173. The lower court found that the plaintiff would not suffer irreparable harm
if an injunction were withheld for several reasons. Id. Its findings were not clearly
erroneous. Id.
222 S. Milk Sales, Inc. v. Martin, 924 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1991).
223 Id. at 102.
220

221
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versus procedure test for resolving the Erie choice-of-law issue. 224
The Court decided that a federal diversity action alleging
misrepresentation and breach of trust under New York law was
barred by the New York statute of limitations even though it was
brought on the equity side in federal court where there had not
been strict adherence to state statutes of limitations. 225 The Court
stated:
[T]he question is not whether a statute of limitations is
deemed a matter of "procedure" in some sense. The
question is whether such a statute concerns merely the
manner and the means by which a right to recover, as
recognized by the State, is enforced, or whether such
statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the
aspect that alone is relevant to our problem, namely,
does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a
federal court to disregard a law of a State that would
be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the
226
same parties in a State court?
The choice of the appropriate injunction standard is not simply
a matter of procedure. A trial court must make an assessment of
the moving party's likelihood of success on the merits under both
state and federal standards. Courts also have to balance the
relative hardships of the parties, and determine whether the
moving party has an adequate remedy at law or will suffer
227
irreparable harm under both state and federal standards.
Moreover, it is important to recognize the practical impact that the

326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
Id. at 101.
226 Id. at 109.
227 Compare supra note 22 and accompanying text, with supra note 25 and accompanying
text. The four part test seems to be applied in all federal circuits, but there is not a uniform
rule on whether or not the sliding scale or balancing approach survived the Supreme
Court's decision in Winter. LAYCOCK, supra note 33, at 354 n.3.
224
225
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grant or denial of temporary relief can have on the outcome of the
underlying dispute between the parties. 228 There is a
risk that plaintiff will be irreparably injured before the
slow processes of litigation can reach a final decision.
But the solution to this problem has its own central
problem: the court is more likely to err when it acts on
partial information after a preliminary [injunction]
hearing, and such an error may lead to an order that
229
causes irreparable injury to defendant.
In view of these factors, there is a substantial argument that a
jurisdiction's preliminary or interlocutory injunction standard is
much more than "merely the manner and means by which a right
to recover ...is enforced. '230 In a sense, this was acknowledged by
the Eleventh Circuit in Ferrero when the court said that this
choice-of-law issue could make a difference in outcome, 231 and it is
seen in statements about rights and certain remedies being so
inextricably intertwined with a substantive right that the denial of
232
the remedy is effectively a denial of the right.

228 YEAZELL,

supra note 7, at 351-52 n.1 (discussing the harm that a performing

injunction can cause when affinity to abate another harm); YEAZELL, supra note 32, at 319
("[Tihe decision about the preliminary injunction will, as a practical matter, end the case.").
229 LAYCOCK, supra note 33, at 353-54 n.2.
230 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). Contra WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 6, § 2943, at 79 (asserting that Rule 65 is procedural in nature in that it merely
provides procedures by which the federal court can handle the cases brought before them).
231 Ferrero v. Associated Materials Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1991). But see
Grossi Consulting, LLC v. Sterling Currency Grp., LLC, 722 S.E.2d 44, 47 (Ga. 2012).
Grossi argued that the interlocutory injunction was in reality a mandatory permanent
injunction that affected the rights of the parties. Id. The court disagreed, emphasizing that
the trial court's order did not render a final decision on the merits because it only preserved
the status quo pending the final hearing. Id.
232 Port of N.Y. Auth. v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745, 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). This court
acknowledged that the issue may have been academic since this case concerned the grant of a
permanent injunction and there was no showing that the New York and federal standards for
permanent injunctive relief were different even though the federal preliminary injunction
standard was more rigorous then the state standard. Id. at 753 & n.10.
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B. DOES FRCP 65 CONTROL?

Based on the Ferrero decision, there is an argument that a
federal court sitting in diversity should apply its federal circuit's
preliminary injunction standard, instead of the state standard,
because the situation is covered by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65(a). 233 The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Hanna v. Plumer that
[w]hen a situation is covered by one of the Federal
Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from
the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice: the court
has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can
refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this
Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie
judgment that the Rule in question transgresses
neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor
234
constitutional restrictions.
In short, when a Federal Rule is on point for the particular
issue of pleading or practice, it governs in a diversity action even if
the application of the state practice would cause a different
result. 235 Even though Rule 65(a) does not provide a standard, let
alone the four factor test,
it does purport to uphold the historic federal judicial
discretion to preserve the situation pending the
WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 6, § 2943, at 78-79.
[It seems clear that plaintiff should be able to obtain a... preliminary
injunction to preserve the status quo even though he is suing to enforce a
state right and those devices are not provided for by the forum's law or are
available only upon a different showing than is required under Rule 65.
See, e.g., Baker v. Select Portfolio Servicing, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127891, at *5, *7 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 6, 2013) (plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65 in a
case filed in the Superior Court of Rockdale County; defendants removed and court stated
"[tihus, the federal standard for granting injunctive relief now applies" and ultimately
denied the plaintiffs motion for a temporary injunction).
234 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
235 FREER, supra note 13, at 542 ("So once a court determines that a federal directive (such
as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure) (1) applies to the facts of the case and (2) is valid, the
Supremacy Clause requires that it be applied."); YEAZELL, supra note 7, at 262-63 n.2(a).
233
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outcome of a case lodged in the court. Thus the rule
may be read as a codification of the traditional federal
equity practice and although the standards are not
articulated, there is enough detail in Rule 65 to make
236
it clear that it embodies an important federal policy.
Moreover, courts have not questioned the constitutionality of Rule
65 or suggested that it falls outside of the U.S. Supreme Court's
rulemaking authority as provided in the Rules Enabling Act
237
(REA).
Notwithstanding the Ferrerodecision and the confident tone of
a statement from a leading treatise that allowing temporary relief
under Rule 65 when it "would not be available under state law
seems consistent with" the decision in Hanna,238 the fact that this
Rule does not state any test provides a strong argument that Rule
239
65 may not be as broad as some scholars and circuits urge.
Another treatise states that Rule 65 "merely sets forth the
procedural terms for the issuance of injunctions ... and does not
240
itself authorize injunctive relief."
The Supreme Court acknowledged in Hanna that there had
been cases where it applied a state rule or practice even though
there was a good argument that the situation was covered by a
Federal Rule. 24 1 The Court explained that
236 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 2943, at 78-79; Ferrero v. Associated Materials Inc.,
923 F.2d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1991).
237 See, e.g., Ferrero,923 F.2d at 1448 (holding Rule 65 constitutional and within the scope

of the Rules Enabling Act); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 2943, at 79. The REA provides
that Rules prescribed by the Supreme Court "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
238 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 2943, at 78.
239 Crump, supra note 9, at 1243-45; see, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740,
749-50 (1980) ('The first question must therefore be whether the scope of the Federal Rule
in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court. It is only if that question is
answered affirmatively that the Hanna analysis applies.").
240 See MOORE, supra note 172.
241 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965). But see Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437-38 (2010) (a majority of the Court read Rule 23 to be
on point and controlling, but the concurring opinion for one justice differed in its
assessment of whether Rule 23 was valid under the REA, and four justices dissented). See
generally FREER, supra note 13, at 552-53 (discussing the opinions in Shady Grove).
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the holding of each such case was not that Erie
commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an
inconsistent state rule, but rather that the scope of the
Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party
urged, and therefore, there being no Federal Rule
which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded
242
the enforcement of state law.
The Sixth Circuit made this point about Rule 65 in Southern Milk
Sales, Inc.243 In addition, the practical impact of the grant or
denial of provisional injunctive relief on the ultimate resolution of
the underlying dispute between the parties 244 supports the
245
contention that Federal Rule 65 is not directly on point.
This analysis of Rule 65 is also supported by the U.S. Supreme
Court's analysis of Rule 59 in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,
Inc. 24 Rule 59 simply states that a court may, on motion, grant a
new trial after a jury trial "for any reason for which a new trial
247
has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court."
Notwithstanding this Rule's silence on specific grounds, federal
courts apply a "shock the conscience" test in determining whether
or not a jury's award of damages might be the basis for a new
trial. 248 Nevertheless, the Court held in Gasperini that a federal
court in a diversity case may be required to apply a state law
standard when assessing whether an award of damages is
excessive. 249 Rule 65, like Rule 59, is silent on the specific grounds
Hanna,380 U.S. at 470.
924 F.2d 98, 101-02 (6th Cir. 1991) ('CThe choice of law question in this case is not settled,
however, merely by the existence of a federal procedural rule governing preliminary
injunctions ....Indeed, the Supreme Court has framed the threshold inquiry as 'whether the
scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the court."').
244 See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
245 Assessing the applicability of a Federal Rule or other federal directive-whether the
Rule or directive is on point-can be difficult. FREER, supra note 13, at 549-54.
246 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
247 FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A).
248 FREER, supra note 13, at 498 (in Federal Court "the jury's assessment of damages may
be the basis of a new trial order if it shocks the judge's conscious").
249 518 U.S. at 430-31, 437. New York had enacted, as part of a tort reform package, a
statute that allowed judges to order a new trial when a verdict deviated materially from
verdicts in similar cases. Id. at 423. This showing more demanding than the traditional
242
243
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for granting provisional relief, and thus a federal court in a
diversity case may be required to apply a state law standard for
granting injunctive relief.
C. THE TYPICAL UNGUIDED ERIE CHOICE

If Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 is not directly on point,
and if the four factor test for evaluating the grant of
preliminary/interlocutory injunctions is not simply a matter of
procedure, then it is necessary to assess a discrepancy between a
federal circuit's practice and a state's practice as the typical
unguided Erie choice. The Court stated in Hanna:
Not only are nonsubstantial, or trivial, variations [in
outcome] not likely to raise the sort of equal protection
problems which troubled the Court in Erie; they are
also unlikely to influence the choice of a forum. The
"outcome-determination" test therefore cannot be read
without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule:
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of
250
inequitable administration of the laws.
Hanna cites the U.S. Supreme Court's 1958 decision in Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,Inc. for the proposition that
2 51
the outcome determination test was not meant to be a talisman.
In that decision, the Court announced a nuanced, multi-factored
approach for deciding whether to follow a particular state practice
when a different federal practice was not governed by a Federal
252
Rule or statute.

"shock the conscience" test commonly followed in federal courts applying Rule 59. Id. at
423-24.
25o Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965); see also Michael S. Green, The Twin Aims
of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1865, 1875 (2013) (discussing problems with how one
applies the "inequitable administration of the laws" test).
251 380 U.S. at 466-67 (citing 356 U.S. 525 (1958)).
252 Green, supra note 250, at 1876 ("[Flederal courts should also consider 'countervailing'
federal interests in favor of a uniform federal rule."); YEAZELL, supra note 7, at 263-64
(setting out approach via flow-chart).
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The Byrd approach requires the court to first determine
whether the state practice is "bound up with the substantive rights
253
and obligations created by state law." If so, state law controls.
If not, then the court is to ask if there are "countervailing
considerations inherent in the federal" approach. If there are,
then the federal practice ordinarily should be followed. 254 Finally,
it is necessary under Byrd to consider the likelihood of a different
outcome if the federal practice is followed instead of the state
practice. 2 55 The Court noted that its discussion of state interests
and countervailing federal interests in this particular case was
made
upon the assumption that the outcome of the litigation
may be substantially affected by whether the issue of
[the defendant's] immunity is decided by a judge or a
jury.
But clearly there is not present here the
certainty that a different result would follow ...or
even the strong possibility that this would be the
256
case.
Even though this is the stuff of Civil Procedure exams and outlines
prepared by Ls throughout the United States, there is not a
proper order for assessing and weighing the several factors from
Hanna and Byrd in making the typical unguided Erie choice. This
Article will start with what Hanna called the twin aims of Erie:
discouraging forum shopping and avoiding the inequitable
257
administration of the laws.
1. Forum Shopping. Could the difference between a federal
circuit's and a state's standards for a preliminary injunction lead
253 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co., 356 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1958); FREER, supra-note 13,
at 531-35; YEAZELL, supra note 7, at 264 n.3.
254 356 U.S. at 537-38; Green, supra note 250, at 1876 (stating that the Byrd concern
about countervailing federal interests is still viable as shown by the Supreme Court's
decision in Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 431-32 (1996)); YEAZELL,
supra note 7, at 264 n.3.
255356 U.S. at 539-40; cf. FREER, supra note 13, at 531-35, 558-61 (discussing Byrd and
providing a suggested synthesis).
256 356 U.S. at 539 (emphasis added).
257 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
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to forum shopping? Consider Georgia, where there is a significant
difference between the state's and the Eleventh Circuit's
standards. 258 Odds are that a plaintiff who is seeking to enjoin his
or her defendant's actions and maintain the status quo pending a
full trial on the merits would prefer the more flexible Georgia
approach and opt for filing in one of Georgia's superior courts
instead of filing in a federal district court in Georgia. At the same
time, the difference in the standards might cause a diverse
defendant sued in a Georgia superior court to remove the case to
federal court if possible. 259 The plaintiffs lawyer would prefer
Georgia's sliding scale, balancing approach to the grant of an
interlocutory injunction instead of the Eleventh Circuit's
established "you must prove all four factors" approach. The
defendant's counsel would want the plaintiff to prove all of the
factors. Even if the balance of hardships decidedly favored the
plaintiff, he or she should still have to show a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits.
On the other hand, is the difference between the standards
really the decisive factor in choosing the forum? For example,
differences in jury selection practices, differences in discovery,
differences in docket management, and perceptions about
appointed judges instead of elected judges are among the
considerations that might affect a litigant's and his or her lawyer's
choice of where to file an action. 260 Moreover, the difference
between the Georgia and Eleventh Circuit standards for
preliminary injunctive relief is not the same qualitatively as the
difference in duty of care at issue in Erie or the difference in what
tolled the running of a state statute of limitations in Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. 26 1 and Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp.262 The difference in the standards for preliminary relief does
See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Ferrero v. Associated Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1991) (showing
a defendant who removed his case under diversity jurisdiction).
260 See, e.g., YEAZELL, supra note 7, at 5 (describing some relevant considerations when
choosing between two courts); see also Green, supra note 250, at 1892-96 (discussing the
rationale for discouraging forum shopping).
261 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
262446 U.S. 740 (1980).
258
259
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not automatically result in a different outcome unlike the
differences at issue in those landmark decisions. The difference in
the standards might be one of many factors that a lawyer weighs
in choosing the forum, but it is not likely to be as decisive as the
differences between state and federal practice seen in some of the
Erie doctrine cases where state law was held to control including
in Erie itself, Guaranty Trust Co., Ragan and Walker.
2. Difference in Outcome. The next consideration is whether
the outcome of the litigation would in fact be substantially affected
by choosing the federal approach to weighing the four factors over
a state's approach. Is there a certainty or even a strong possibility
that a different result will follow from the choice? 263 The answer is
no because a substantially different outcome should not
automatically result even when a state's standard clearly permits
a balancing or sliding scale approach, while the approach followed
in that state's federal circuit requires the moving party to meet his
or her burden on each factor.
First, the final decision after a full trial on the merits should
not be substantially affected by going with the federal standard
instead of a state's standard for provisional relief. A court's ruling
on a preliminary or interlocutory injunction is not final. That
ruling will have a significant practical impact in the litigation, but
the underlying dispute is not permanently resolved by a court's
ruling on a moving party's request for temporary relief. If the
provisional relief is granted the defendant is not permanently
barred from engaging in particular conduct.
Preliminary or
interlocutory injunctions under both federal and state standards
are for a limited duration,264 and a "trial court's findings and legal
rulings at [this] stage" of litigation are subject to be "dissolved or
modified as the case develops" or circumstances change. 265
263

Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 539 (1958) ("[C]learly there is not

present here the certainty that a different result would follow ... or even the strong
possibility that this would be the case.").
264 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 2943, at 79 ("[Tlhey only afford temporary relief."); see
generally O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(a) (2015) (detailing the interlocutory injunctions involvement
in the later trial).
265 Bishop v. Patton, 706 S.E.2d 634, 643 (Ga. 2011); see also Grossi Consulting, LLC v.
Sterling Currency Grp., LLC, 722 S.E.2d 44, 47 (Ga. 2012) ("The purpose of an interlocutory
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Second, even though the grant or denial of an interlocutory or
preliminary injunction may often, "as a practical matter, end the
case,"266 it does not necessarily follow that a Georgia superior court
and a federal district court in Georgia would rule differently on a
request for provisional relief due to the difference in the standards.
Even though a court under Georgia's more flexible standard can
issue an interlocutory injunction without requiring the moving
party to satisfy each of the four criteria by a preponderance of the
evidence, it does not follow that utilizing the Eleventh Circuit
standard will lead necessarily to a different result on granting or
denying relief.
When presented with the same facts at a
preliminary or interlocutory injunction hearing, it is likely that the
state court and the federal court will rule substantially the same
way.
The primary concerns under both state and federal
standards are preventing irreparable harm and maintaining the
status quo pending the ultimate resolution of the dispute between
the parties. 267 Under both approaches, the court must make an
assessment of the moving party's likelihood of success on the
merits, the threat of irreparable harm, the relative equities or
hardships of the parties, and the public interest. The risks of
making a faulty assessment of hardships, of the moving party's
likelihood of success on the merits, of irreparable harm, and of the
public interest are inherent in both approaches. This situation is
somewhat analogous to the judge versus jury determination of the
issue of immunity in Byrd, in which the Court assumed outcome
could be substantially affected but found no certain or even a
268
strong possibility that it would be.
In the Capital Tool decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit used some of this reasoning in responding to an
argument that a trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction in
injunction is preliminary and preparatory; it looks to a future final hearing, and while
contemplating what the result of that hearing may be, it does not settle what it shall be.").
266 YEAZELL, supra note 32, at 319.
267 Bishop, 706 S.E.2d at 638-39; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 2948.1; see also Morath,
supra note 46, at 160 (saying that there has been no significant change in the rate at which
preliminary injunctions are granted in environmental cases post Winter but reporting that
environmental lawyers regard Winter as a serious problem).
268 See supra note 256 and accompanying text.

1220

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1169

a diversity case was erroneous because Virginia's trade secret act
did not require a showing of irreparable injury. 269 The court said
that the plaintiff, in making this argument, failed to understand
the difference between preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief; the goal of the former is to preserve the relative positions of
the parties until trial.270 Typically, the parties are not able to
provide the court with enough evidence to decide the merits at a
preliminary injunction hearing so it is necessary for the court to
"balance the hardships the parties [would] suffer pending [full]
trial according to the factors set forth in [the Fourth Circuit's]
27 1
Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Selig ManufacturingCo." decision.
The appellate court acknowledged that Blackwelder dealt with a
federal claim but said that the decision's principles also applied in
diversity cases. 272 It then added that there was not much of a
difference between the Virginia and federal standards: under
either approach the plaintiff was not entitled to a preliminary
injunction as a matter of right.27 3 Accordingly, it was essential for
the district court to weigh several of the factors that traditionally
274
guided the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction.
Decisions by federal district courts in New York and in Iowa
have reached similar results: the choice between the state and the
federal preliminary injunction standards is not likely to result in a
substantial difference in outcome, so the federal standard should
275
be used.
269

Capital Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Maschinenfabrik Herkules, 837 F.2d 171, 172 (4th Cir. 1988).

270

Id.

Id. (citing Blackwelder, 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977)).
Id. at 173.
273 Id.
The court asserted that even if Virginia's trade secret act had lowered the hurdles
that had to be crossed before a judge could grant an injunction, that act still gave the court
discretion by providing that the threatened misappropriation of a trade secret may be
enjoined. Id.
274 Id.
275 Pro Edge, L.P. v. Gue, 374 F. Supp. 2d 711, 735 (N.D. Iowa 2005) ("[Tjhe
question ... would not be 'outcome determinative' as Iowa courts apply roughly the same
[standards], although the Iowa standard may... be more lenient."); Uncle B's Bakery Inc.
v. O'Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405, 1422 (N.D. Iowa 1996) ("[A~s a practical matter, [the]
application of federal rather than Iowa law.., would not be 'outcome determinative,' as
Iowa courts apply roughly the same test as do federal courts of [the Eighth Circuit]
although the Iowa standard may... be more lenient."); Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, 878
271

272
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3. Inequitable Administration of the Laws. Although the
differences between a states and the applicable federal
preliminary injunction standard might lead to some forum
shopping, those differences do not raise the kind of litigant
inequality issues that concerned the Supreme Court in Erie and its
276
progeny.
For instance, the duty of care the Erie Railroad owed a
trespasser was much lower under Pennsylvania law than under
the general federal common law which treated Tompkins as an
invitee-Tompkins wins as an invitee but he loses if he is deemed
a trespasser. 277 The plaintiff in Guranty Trust Co. was barred by a
state statute of limitations while under federal equity practice it
was not barred by laches-the plaintiff had a viable claim in
federal court in contrast to having the claim time barred if state
law apphed. 278 Also, the plaintiffs' claims in Ragan and Walker
were filed in a timely fashion under Federal Rule 3 but were not
served on the defendants within the statute of limitations as
required by state law-those plaintiffs were litigating in federal
court as opposed to having their claims time-barred and dismissed

F. Supp. 1224, 1244 (N.D. Iowa 1995) ("As a practical matter, application of federal rather
than Iowa law to the question... will not be 'outcome determinative.' "); Webcraft Techs.,
Inc. v. McCaw, 674 F. Supp. 1039, 1042 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting defendant's argument
that New York law should dictate whether a preliminary injunction should be issued and
stating that the court was "convinced that preliminary relief [was] appropriate under the
New York, as well as the Second Circuit, standard"). Cf. Morath, supra note 46, at 160
(suggesting that there had not been a significant change in the rate at which preliminary
injunctions have been granted in environmental cases after Winter-supporting the
proposition in the text that the choice between the post-Winter federal standard and a
state's traditional sliding scale or balancing approach should not result in a substantial
difference in outcome).
276 FREER, supra note 13, at 517 (describing basic notes of litigant equality); Green, supra
note 250, at 1875 (discussing inequality created by substantially different state and federal
rules).
277 Eric R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70-71 (1938). Under state law, as a trespasser,
Tompkins would lose because he would have to prove willful or wanton behavior by the
railroad. Id. at 70. Under the general federal common law, as an invitee, he only had to
establish mere negligence and could win. Id.; see also FREER, supra note 13, at 515.
278 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945). The lower court, sitting as a
court of equity, allowed the plaintiff to proceed because it was not guilty of laches. FREER,
supranote 13, at 526.
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in their respective state courts. 279 In each of these venerable cases
the choice of federal law instead of state law was black and white:
the selection was decisive in determining whether the plaintiff had
a viable claim. From the defendants' perspectives there was
unequal administration of the laws in each case if the federal
courts were allowed to follow the federal practice or standard
instead of being controlled by the state practice or standard.
In contrast, following the preliminary injunction standard used
in a federal circuit like the Eleventh instead of a state's practice
like Georgia's interlocutory injunction standard does not result in
such an all or nothing, viable claim or no viable claim, in court or
thrown out of court, difference in respect to the plaintiff's
underlying claim. The choice does not result in litigant inequality.
In regard to the employment litigation hypothetical presented
earlier in this Article, 280 the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia sitting in Augusta could very well grant a
preliminary injunction virtually identical in all respects to an
interlocutory injunction granted by a Georgia Superior Court
sitting in Augusta on the same set of facts.
4. State and FederalInterests. The Byrd approach requires the
court to first determine whether the state practice is bound up
with substantive rights and obligations created by state law. If so,
state law controls. 28 1 If not, then the court is to ask if there are
countervailing considerations inherent in the federal approach. If
there are, then the federal practice ordinarily should be
followed. 28 2
"Unfortunately, the [Supreme] Court has never
defined 'bound up.' It seems, though, that the phrase encompasses
things that define the state's assessment of when someone is
entitled to recover from another." 2s3 Moreover, the Court did not
279 Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 742-43 (1980); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 531-32 (1949); see also FREER, supra note 13, at 528
(discussing the limitations practice in Ragan). But see Green, supra note 250, at 1896-1900
(presenting a different view about what this means).
?80 See supra Part II.
281 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1958); FREER, supra note
13, at 531-35; Green, supra note 250, at 1879; YEAZELL, supra note 7, at 264 n.3.
282 356 U.S. at 537-38; YEAZELL, supra note 7, at 264 n.3.
283FREER, supra note 13, at 533.
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provide guidance about weighing competing state and federal
interests. 2 4 Nevertheless, this Article takes a stab at assessing
and weighing state and federal interests in the context of the
discrepancy between Georgia's and the Eleventh Circuit's
respective interlocutory and preliminary injunction standards.
Although the codification of equity by the Georgia legislature in
the nineteenth century can be seen as evidencing the state's strong
interest-making this important area of practice predictable and
concrete, 28 5 codification did not set Georgia's equity practice and
procedure at odds with federal interests and federal equity
practice. The standards are not competing. Instead, state and
federal interests are congruent. Preliminary injunctions granted
by federal district courts in Georgia and interlocutory injunctions
issued by Georgia's superior courts are intended to maintain the
28 6
status quo pending the outcome of a full trial on the merits.
Both the Georgia legislature and the Georgia Supreme Court
direct lower courts to use caution and prudence in ruling on
requests for interlocutory injunctions. 28 7 Similarly, the Eleventh
Circuit has said that the "preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary and drastic remedy. '288 The Georgia Civil Practice
Act has a bond requirement for interlocutory injunctions in section
9-11-65(c) 28 9 and so does Federal Rule 65(c) in regard to
preliminary injunctions. 290 Both the Georgia Code and the U.S.
Code allow immediate appeals of the grant or denial of these

2s0
285
286

Id. at 535.
See supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1323, 1339 (N.D.

Ga. 2011), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v.
Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 1269 (11th Cir. 2012); Bishop v. Patton, 706 S.E.2d 634,
638 (Ga. 2011); Green v. Waddleton, 654 S.E.2d 204, 206 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
287 O.C.G.A. § 9-5-8 (2007); Bishop, 706 S.E.2d at 638.
288Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th
Cir. 2003).
- O.C.G.AK § 9-11-65(c) (2015).
290FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). Federal Rule 65(c) seems to require the posting of a bond while
Georgia's version is permissive.
Compare id. ("The court may issue a preliminary
injunction.., only if the movant gives security...."), with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(c) ("As a
prerequisite to the issuance of... an interlocutory injunction, the court may require the
giving of security ....
").

1224

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1169

injunctions.91 Finally, the standard of appellate review for the
grant or denial of these injunctions is the same in both the Georgia
292
Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit; abuse of discretion.
Justice Frankfurter's Guaranty Trust Co. discussion of the
authority of federal courts to hear and decide equity suits in cases
of diversity jurisdiction, although perhaps dicta, 293 says a great
deal about federal interests and the relationship between equity in
the states and equity practice in the federal courts. 294 He wrote
that "Congress never gave, nor did the federal courts ever claim,
the power to deny substantive rights created by State law or to
create substantive rights denied by State law. ' 295 But
[t]his does not mean that whatever equitable remedy
is available in a State court must be available in a
diversity suit in a federal court, or conversely, that a
federal court may not afford an equitable remedy not
available in a State court. Equitable relief in a federal
court is of course subject to restrictions: the suit must
be within the traditional scope of equity as historically
evolved in the English Court of Chancery...; a plain,
adequate and complete remedy at law must be
wanting...; explicit Congressional curtailment of
equity powers must be respected.. .; the constitutional
right to trial by jury cannot be evaded .... That a
State may authorize its courts to give equitable relief
unhampered by any or all such restrictions cannot
remove these fetters from the federal courts.... State
law cannot define the remedies which a federal court
must give simply because a federal court in diversity
jurisdiction is available as an alternative tribunal to
the State's courts. Contrariwise, a federal court may
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2012), with O.C.G.A § 5-6-34(a)(4) (2013).
Horton v. City of St. Augustine, 272 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001); Bishop, 706
S.E.2d at 638; Hampton Island Founders v. Liberty Capital, 658 S.E.2d 619, 623 (Ga. 2008).
293 Cross, supra note 9, at 174 (suggesting Justice Frankfurter's discussion was dicta);
Crump, supra note 9, at 1241 (same).
294 See generally Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
295 Id. at 105.
291
292
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afford an equitable remedy for a substantive right
recognized by a State even though a State court cannot
give it.... [T]he body of adjudications concerning
equitable relief in diversity cases leaves no doubt that
the federal courts enforced State-created substantive
rights if the mode of proceeding and remedy were
consonant with the traditional body of equitable
remedies, practice and procedure, and in so doing they
were enforcing rights created by the States and not
296
arising under any inherent or statutory federal law.
Dicta or not, this passage shows that there are affirmative
federal considerations at work in regard to a federal court's
exercise of its equitable power. 297 Given the similarities between
the federal and Georgia standards for provisional relief, these
should not be regarded as countervailing considerations as in Byrd
where the federal system's allocation of functions between judge
and jury and the command of the Seventh Amendment were at
odds with the South Carolina practice of having the judge decide a
particular contested issue. 298 Still, these federal interests and
considerations are weighty and giving them effect is consistent
with the fact that the "federal system is an independent system for
administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its
jurisdiction. '299 These considerations weigh in favor of having a
federal district court in Georgia exercising diversity jurisdiction
apply the Eleventh Circuit's preliminary injunction standard
instead of Georgia's interlocutory injunction standard. This would
not be at odds with Georgia's interests.
D. WHAT ABOUT PRESUMPTIONS?

Another issue that needs to be considered in making the choice
between state and federal standards for the grant of a preliminary

Id. at 105-07 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
Cf. Cross, supra note 9, at 231-32; Crump, supra note 9, at 1257-58.
298 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-39 (1958).
299 Id. at 537.
296
297
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injunction concerns the use of presumptions. If a state court is
able to apply certain presumptions in weighing the four traditional
criteria for provisional relief, does a federal court in that state
have to apply those presumptions or would that be contrary to the
U.S. Supreme Court's eBay decision rejecting categorical
300
presumptions in regard to the grant of permanent injunctions?
It has been asserted that eBay has had a "cataclysmic effect" in the
lower courts, and that established presumptions which were
applied when preliminary injunctions were sought have been
30
swept away.

1

For example, in patent cases prior to eBay it was often
presumed that the violation of the patent owner's right to exclude
justified a preliminary injunction given the difficulty of protecting
this right through monetary remedies that allowed the infringer to
continue using the patented invention against the patent owner's
wishes. 30 2 Similarly, under Georgia's equity jurisprudence there
are a number of situations where irreparable harm is presumed
when the plaintiff shows that a particular right is being violated
by the defendant. The two Georgia Supreme Court decisions
discussed earlier in this Article illustrate how these presumptions
can work. In the Stiles Apartments, Inc. litigation, the plaintiffs
property interests were threatened by local government and
irreparable harm was presumed due to the unique nature of an
interest in real property. 30 3 Similarly, in the litigation over the
DeKalb County ordinances ostensibly aimed at restricting nude
dancing, which is recognized as expressive conduct under

300 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006); LAYCOCK, supra note 33,
at 340 n.4 (discussing split of authority over confused viability of presumptions after eBay);
Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 38, at 211-13 (discussing presumptions); see also
Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149-50 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding
that eBay abolishes any presumption of irreparable injury in patent cases but reversing a
district court's refusal to enter an injunction in view of the plaintiffs loss of market share
and pricing power along with the difficulty of measuring damages).
301 Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 38, at 205.
302 eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
303 Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke Cnty. v. Stiles Apartments, Inc., 723 S.E.2d 681, 683
(Ga. 2012); see also Focus Entm't, Int'l, Inc. v. Partridge Greene, Inc., 558 S.E.2d 440, 446
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001) ("[Wlhen an interest in land is threatened with harm, equitable
injunctive relief is appropriate."); supra notes 118-34 and accompanying text.
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Georgia's free-speech clause, 30 4 the court was willing to presume
irreparable harm in light of threats, the ordinances posed to those
free-speech interests. 30 5 Similarly, Georgia courts have frequently
stated that fraudulent transfer cases are amenable to interlocutory
injunctive relief in order to prevent a defendant from placing
assets beyond the court's reach and thus leaving the plaintiff
remediless. 3 6 Courts in other jurisdictions have said that a
plaintiff does not have to plead or prove irreparable harm when it
is able to show the violation of a statute that authorizes injunctive
307
relief.
There is, however, uncertainty in the federal courts after the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in eBay v. MercExchange as to
whether such categorical presumptions can still be made.3 08 The
eBay case deals with permanent injunctions, but it is having an
impact on how federal courts are ruling on preliminary injunctions
as well. 30 9 For example, in Osmose, Inc. v. Viance, LLC, the
Eleventh Circuit asked, but did not decide, whether irreparable
harm could still be presumed after the eBay decision once it
determined that the defendant had made false statements and
See Harris v. Entm't Sys., Inc., 386 S.E.2d 140, 141-42 (Ga. 1989).
305Great Am. Dream, Inc. v. DeKalb Cnty., 727 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Ga. 2012); see also supra
notes 134-55 and accompanying text.
" Bishop v. Patton, 706 S.E.2d 634, 639 (Ga. 2011) (citing Edwards v. United Food
Brokers, 22 S.E.2d 812 (Ga. 1942); Kinard v. Ryman Farm Homeowners' Ass'n, 598 S.E.2d
479 (Ga. 2004)); see also SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 709 S.E.2d
267, 273-74 (Ga. 2011) (reaffirming Bishop). But see O.C.G.A. § 9-5-6 (2007) (providing
that, as a general rule, creditors without liens may not enjoin their debtors from disposing
of property).
307 Capital Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Maschinenfabrik Herkules, 837 F.2d 171, 172 (4th Cir.
1988); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 894 F. Supp. 2d 691, 698, 704 (E.D.
Va. 2012). But see England v. USA Fed. Credit Union, 2008 WL 660294, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 6, 2008).
3-0 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149-50
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussing viability of presumptions after eBay); see Gergen, Golden &
Smith, supra note 38, at 211-13. Courts used to presume irreparable injury in intellectual
property cases because damages are very difficult to measure but courts are now split on
whether any such presumption is allowed. LAYCOCK, supra note 33, at 340 n.4.
309 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010) ("[A]nd once again, the
Court appeared oblivious to any differences between permanent and preliminary injunctions."
(reaffirming eBay's four factor text)); see also LAYCOCK, supra note 33, at 341 n.7 (discussing
Monsanto and its impact); Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 38, at 205, 210-13.
304
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misrepresentations about the plaintiffs product. 310
In North
American Medical Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc. the Eleventh
Circuit declined to decide whether the lower court was correct,
after the eBay decision, to hold that a finding of "trademark
311
infringement [gave] rise to a presumption of irreparable injury."
"In other words, we decline to address whether such a
presumption is the equivalent of the categorical rules rejected by
312
the Court in eBay."
The basic question is as follows: if a federal circuit court applies
the lessons about permanent injunctions from eBay to preliminary
injunctions so that traditional presumptions about irreparable
harm are rejected, such as the categorical rules that were rejected
in eBay, then is a federal district court in that circuit, hearing a
diversity case, prevented from using presumptions about
irreparable harm that would otherwise be followed in the forum
state's courts? Specifically, can a federal district court in Georgia,
in ruling on a preliminary injunction in a diversity case, consider
and weigh Georgia's equity jurisprudence on presumptions of
irreparable harm?
One answer is to recognize that presumptions are not per se
rules. They are rebuttable principles, derived from years of
practical experience, which have simplified litigation. The Georgia
Code provides that the "[a]ctual or threatened misappropriation [of
a trade secret] may be enjoined." 313 A court may very well refuse
to grant an injunction against a misappropriation of trade secrets
when damages are shown to be an adequate remedy. 314 Although
Georgia courts have stated that "when an interest in land is
threatened with
harm,
equitable
injunctive
relief is
appropriate," 315 this presumption "does not preclude the denial
310 612 F.3d 1298, 1320 (11th Cir. 2010) C[No presumption was necessary because [the trial
court found that] the advertisements, on their face, would likely cause irreparable harm.').
1 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008) (declining to address the question because the
district court had not addressed the effect of eBay).
312 Id.
313 O.C.G.A § 10-1-762(a) (2009) (emphasis added).
314 Amedisys Holding, LLC v. Interim Healthcare of Atlanta, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 1302,
1314 n.15 (N.D. Ga. 2011).
315 Focus Entm't Int'l, Inc. v. Partridge Greene, Inc., 558 S.E.2d 440, 446 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
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of... an interlocutory injunction when the [court determines that
the plaintiff] is unlikely to prevail on his claim." 3 16 Similarly, a

motion to enjoin the operation of a nuisance that allegedly harms
the moving party's property interests might be denied if the court
finds that the plaintiff has lived next to the alleged nuisance for
several years and that the requested injunction would alter the
status quo. 317 Although presumptions have simplified litigation by

being practical and by reflecting many years of dealing with
certain kinds of disputes time and time again, they do not
guarantee particular results. Another answer is that federal
courts should not read eBay as replacing traditional approaches to
the tests for preliminary relief. Instead, they should continue to
employ the "structured sets of presumptions and safety valves that
318
have characterized traditional [equity] practice."
V. CONCLUSION
The standard for granting preliminary injunctions in some
states is not the same as the preliminary injunction standard that
is used in the federal district courts in the federal circuit where
the state is located. For example, the standard for interlocutory
injunctions in Georgia is not the same as the standard for
preliminary injunctions used in the Eleventh Circuit. Georgia's
superior courts and the federal district courts in Georgia consider
four similar factors in deciding whether to grant or deny
provisional injunctive relief, but a balancing or sliding-scale
approach can be used in Georgia's courts where the moving party
need not prove all four of the factors. In contrast, the Eleventh
Circuit insists that the plaintiff must clearly establish the burden
of persuasion as to all four elements. The interlocutory injunction
standard in Georgia's courts is not as demanding as the
Toberman v. Larose Ltd., 637 S.E.2d 158, 162 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
Green v. Waddleton, 654 S.E.2d 204, 206 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (involving a plaintiff who
had lived next to a kennel for several years before alleging it was a nuisance and seeking
injunctive relief); DBL, Inc. v. Carson, 585 S.E.2d 87, 92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (involving a
similar result in respect to a marina that had been operating in front of the plaintiffs
property for years).
318 Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 38, at 206.
316
317
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preliminary injunction standard in Georgia's federal district
319
courts.
This kind of difference in the standards for preliminary
injunctions between a state court and a federal court in that state
implicates the principles announced in Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins 320 and that venerable decision's progeny. Specifically,
should a federal district court in Georgia apply the Eleventh
Circuit's standard in a diversity case or does the Erie doctrine
require it to apply Georgia's standard for interlocutory
injunctions? It is reasonable to assume that a plaintiff seeking to
enjoin particular actions by a diverse defendant would prefer the
Georgia standard and would forum shop by filing his or her claim
in a Georgia superior court, and that the diverse defendant would,
in turn, remove the case to federal district court if possible. Also,
it is conceivable, given the discrepancy between the standards,
that there could be a difference in outcome on the grant or denial
of provisional injunctive relief depending on which standard is
applied-with the plaintiff favoring Georgia's interlocutory
injunction standard because it is not as demanding as the
Eleventh Circuit standard.
Notwithstanding the possibility of forum shopping and of
different outcomes on the grant or denial of the interlocutory or
preliminary injunction, this Article concludes that a federal
district court should apply its circuit's standard, not the forum
state's standard. This conclusion is not justified by saying Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) is on point and controls, or because
the choice of the appropriate standard is simply a matter of
procedure. Rather, it is justified by analyzing and weighing the
several factors that were announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Hanna v. Plumer and Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative, Inc. 32 1 for the typical unguided Erie choice. Of these
factors, the most important are: that the differences between the
standards do not result in litigant inequality, that the forum
319
320
321

text.

See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
380 U.S. 460 (1965); 356 U.S. 525 (1958); see also supra notes 249-99 and accompanying
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state's and the federal circuit's interests in the grant or denial of
equitable relief are not at odds but congruent, and that the grant
or denial of this interim equitable relief is provisional and not a
final adjudication of the merits of the claim. Moreover, given the
similarity of the four criteria weighed by the respective courts,
there is a good chance that the state court and a federal district
court in the forum state would, on the same set of facts, enter
substantially similar orders on a plaintiffs motion for an
interlocutory or preliminary injunction.

